The Battle of Dien Bien Phu

Originally posted by Sikander However the Vietminh almost collapsed in one of the assaults, as the casualties were appaling. Giap strongly considered a retreat but it was his determination, and his army's, that gave him the extra "�lan" to fight the battle to the very end. The French did comit a stupid mistake, against the opinion of most the field commanders. The Air Force experts spoke against it as supplying ground forces from the air was very difficult, especially under the expected AA fire; ground commanders also distrusted a plan in which they would stay sorrounded by mountains, prefering instead to continue raiding operations like they had been doing for years.  But when graduates from a Military Academy think that a war in the jungle is like a war in Western Europe, what can we expect?

However the form of fighting war the French practiced at Dien Bien Phu was quite common during the war. Also many commanders on the ground thought it gave them the high ground.

However the Vietminh almost collapsed in one of the assaults, as the casualties were appaling. Giap strongly considered a retreat but it was his determination, and his army's, that gave him the extra "�lan" to fight the battle to the very end.

The French did comit a stupid mistake, against the opinion of most the field commanders. The Air Force experts spoke against it as supplying ground forces from the air was very difficult, especially under the expected AA fire; ground commanders also distrusted a plan in which they would stay sorrounded by mountains, prefering instead to continue raiding operations like they had been doing for years. 

Well, regarding the course of the battle the French repeated a classic mistake, similar to that at Sedan in the Franco-Prussian war, of allowing themselves to become 'trapped' in the 'low ground' and ceding the surrounding high ground to the enemy.  Admittedly they were depending on the difficult terrain preventing the Viet Minh from bringing their heavy artillery up.  However I believe it was Napoleon himself who stated, as a 'military principle' that one cannot depend on undefended terrain itself to hold off an enemy indefinitely.  Unopposed, determined troops will 'find a way', as the Viet Minh in fact did.  I remember hearing a story about how, while the Viet Minh were hauling an artillery piece up a steep slope by hand, a rope slipped and the gun started to slide back down the slope.  One of the Viet Minh soldiers threw himself under the wheels of the gun carriage to prevent it from going all the way back down the slope.  He was mortally injured as a result.  That story seems to illustrate the determination that the French were up against, which they badly underestimated.  In any case, once the Viet Minh had established themselves up in the surrounding mountains, the French were pretty much dead - it was just a matter of time and how many casualties they could inflict.  The loss of this battle pretty much spelt the end of the French position in Indochina. 

As for what impact it may have had on 'the rest' of their empire, for example Algeria, I'm not so sure it made a lot of difference.  The French were no longer strong enough to hold it together, and had lost much of their 'reputation' having been defeated and occupied by Germany in WWII.  The US and the USSR were the established superpowers and unless the US stepped in, as they did in Vietnam, the French weren't really capable of sustaining their 'imperial holdings'.  If anything, the loss in Vietnam caused them to want to hold onto Algeria even more.  I suppose the rebels in Algeria may have gain confidence that France could be defeated.  However, the loss of the remaining French 'empire' was probably inevitable in the wake of WWII.