Thanks for your work. Since it's already so complete for the first
punic war, I've decided to upload it with the update coming soon (and
update as it goes along)
BTW, about that latin phrase, "Carthage must be destroyed" is a correct
littteral translation. If you want it more down to earth literal, then
you can also say "Carthage is to be destroyed." In english, "is to be"
is considered to be eqivalent to "must be" in this case.
Delenda is a gerundive, which translates by it self to be "to be
destroyed." If you want to say "Carthage is destroyed," you would
say Carthago deleta est. (deleta and delenda are both participles of
the same word)
While Economus brewed and Regalus stormed North Africa events in Sicily
progressed further. By 254 B.C. the Romans had taken the city of
Panormus, which was one of the largest cities still allied to
Carthrage, forcing the Carthiginians into a sole enclave in the
northwest. Lipara and Thermae had also fallen to the Romans, and
it seems that the Romans had gained the upperhand in the war.
However, their overall momentum had slowed considerably, especially
when one of two consular armies left Sicily. The withdrawl of an
army also persuaded Hadrusbal, the commander who had replaced Hamilcar
while Hamilcar was still in North Africa, to move his armies from
Lilybaum to Panormus, where the sole consular army was staying for the
time being. Metellus, the commander of the Roman army, watched
while Hadrusbal camped from the city, and soon showed a reluctance to
fight a pitched battle, which spurred Hadrusbal to march up right to
the city wall to show the Sicilian cities that the Romans were
cowards. This, however, forced Hadrusbal's army to cross a river,
which would give him little space to move and would cut off any
attempts to withdraw. Metellus has given explicit orders for the
Velites to march out and begin hammering the Carthiginians with
their pilae, especially at elephants, and if hard pressed he
told his men to take cover in an specially prepared trench line running
right outside the city walls. Hadrusbal launched his elephants to
hit the Roman lines, which they did, and the Roman Velites
withdrew to the trench line, keeping a steady stream of missiles
launching at the elephants and other Carthiginian soldiers.
Consequently, the Punic elephants ran amok and stampeded back to their
own lines killing Punic infantry and creating havoc, allowing Metellus
to launch his long awaited counter offensive from inside the
city. This charging column hit the Carthiginians in the flank and
the Punic army turned to rout, ending in some ten thousand to thirty
thousand casualties, although the latter seems somewhat
unrealistic. The elephants were all killed or captured, ending in
a very big blow to the Carthiginian war effort, for the elephants
provided the same type of scare which had first penetrated the Germans
when they witnessed the new Soviet tanks in 1941.
The victory gave the Romans the confidence they needed to continue with
the campaigns on Sicily and this was to be the last pitched battle of
the First Punic War, and in 250 B.C. the Romans underwent another
offensive to rid Sicily of the Carthiginians.
Lilybaum, one of two large ports still in enemy hands, was sorrounded
by one hundred and ten thousand men and a sizable fleet, and the Romans
constructed plenty of siegeworks. The garrison in Lilybaum proved
very violent and excessive sallies were launched against the Romans,
and even some defensive sapping. The siege proved extremely
difficult for the Romans and resulted in heavy casualties, and the
Romans decided to settle in for a siege to starve out the defenders.
As for the naval war, the Romans had done extensive damaged by raiding
the Carthiginian coastline along North Africa, and at one point a large
portion of the Roman fleet ran aground on modern Djerba, although they
were saved at high tide. When the same fleet sailed back to Italy
one hundred and fifty ships were destroyed in a strong storm, and the
fleet would have to be rebuilt. At Lilybaum two hundred of these
ships were present, however, the geography these ships had to deal with
was horrible and it gave them a horrible experience in naval
warfare. The Roman blockade was dishonored when fifty Punic ships
managed to run right through the Roman web and into the harbor and then
back out in a daring night movement. In order to stop the
blockade runners the Romans decided to fill the minir passages into the
city with boulders, but most of the material dropped was carried away
by the currents.
In 249 B.C. Roman consul Publius Claudius Pulcher decided to mount a
raid on Deprana, the second strongest port still in Carthiginian
hands. It ended in disaster as his disordely fleet of some one
hundred and twenty ships moved into harbor, but witnessed the
Carthiginian fleet leaving right as they entered. Claudius moved
to cut the fleet off but failed and he manuevered to form a new battle
line when the Punic armada turned to battle the Romans. In a
sharp melee the Roman fleet was largely destroyed, and it proved to be
the first, and last, major defeat of Roman naval forced by Carthiginian
seamen.
The Romans faced further setbacks, including the loss of some
transports when one hundred and twenty warships escorted eight hundred
transports. It seems that the warships halted to allow the rest
of the transports to catch up and some transports were sent alone, or
with minor escort, and these were raided by the Carthiginians.
They were only saved through the inginuity of using city defenses to
stave off the attacks. However, the fleet was not saved, as the
Roman commander decided to avoid the Carthiginian fleet and began to
sail close to the rocks of Sicily. A heavy wind picked up and
caused most of the ships to be thrown against the seawall and rocks of
the coast, causing a second disaster at the hands of a natural
force. The Senate now found itself in trouble, as it lacked the
funds to build another fleet.
However, private families and Rome's allies were quick to lend the
Senate funds, and another two hundred quinqueremes were built by 243
B.C. The new fleet was placed under the command of Caius Lutatius
Catalus, and the Romans renewed their blockades on Drepana and
Lilybaum. Carthrage decided to pull off another fleet of some two
hundred and fifty ships and sent them to Sicily. However, the
hasty construction and crew training would ensure that the Carthiginian
crews were not the same as those that had fought the Romans in prior
engagements. They were told to destroy the Roman fleet. The
Punic warfleet sailed to a position just off the Aegates Islands to
prepare for a further trip to eryx. Catalus found out about their
movements before they had a chance to leave, however, and moved his
ships to the area. On 10 March 241 Hanno, the commander of the
fleet, moved to link up with the land army, and Catalus moved to
intercept the Carthiginian fleet, although the odds were agaisnt
him. His gamble paid off and the Carthiginians prepared for
battle. The battle was quick, and the Romans manged to sink fift
ships and capture seventeen. Again, though, the Carthiginian
fleets that survived escaped their death. However, the victory
had been decisive.
All in all the Romans had suffered around five hundred ships destroyed,
although Polybius claims seven hundred. The Carthiginians
suffered around half a thousand also. This prompted the
Carthiginians to sue for peace, led by Hamilcar Barca. The
Carthiginians were forced to agree to the evacuation of Sicily
(although in tact and as an army), neither Rome nor Carthrage was to
attack one's allies, all Roman prisoners would be let go while Punic
prisoners would be ransomed and two thousand two hundred Euboean
talents would be paid to Rome over twenty years. The latter was
risen to three thousand two hundred talents when Rome looked over the
treaty. Carthrage, as said before, accepted.
What I remember from my latin classes about the Punic Wars is the Delenda est Carthago (Carthage must be destroyed) slogan by Cato (or was it Scipio?).
That comes in the Third Punic War..or Part III of the installation..I
still have a lot in between before I get there... and the actual
translation, although historians may change it to fit the books better,
is Carthrage is gone..or something of the like...I'm in Latin 5-6...I
haven't learned Delenda yet..hehehe... it just sounds like "gone" or
something of the like.
What I remember from my latin classes about the Punic Wars is the Delenda est Carthago (Carthage must be destroyed) slogan by Cato (or was it Scipio?).
Chapter VI: Ecnomus and the Roman Invasion of North Africa
Following the Carthiginian defeat and the subsequent setback at
Tyndaris both nations began to construct massive fleets in which to
wage a naval war. In 256 B.C. the Senate decided to escalate the
war and invade North Africa, and for this ultimate objective the Romans
were able to compose a fleet of around three hundred and thirty
warships. These crossed over to Messana where they picked up the
soldiers for the invasion, giving a total crew of one hundred and forty
thousand men, according to Polybius. The Carthiginians set sail
to counter this fleet with three hundred and fifty ships, which sailed
to Lilybaeum, and then to Heraclea Minoa, and their strength was around
one hundred and fifty thousand men. In essence the Carthiginians
had assembled the largest fleet their empire had ever conjured, and
they decided to stop the Roman fleet off Sicily.
Both consuls, Lucius Manlius Vulso and Marcus Atilius Regulus, were
sent to command the fleet and the infantry. The Roman fleet was
divided into four, numbered I through IV, with I and II led by the
consuls, and III and IV lined up into the apex of a triangle with
squadron III forming the base, I and II the two sides, and IV a further
reinforcement and rear guard behind the III. Squadron IV was
consequently nicknamed the triarii, as they were the reserves of
the Roman fleet. This quite advance formation shows the maturity
of the Roman crews and strateticians following Tyndaris.
The Carthiginians maneuvered once they had the Romans in sight, and
they placed a numerous left wing, that closest to Sicily, angled so
that it seemed that it had flanked the Roman formation. To the
very right commanded Hanno - who had prior to Ecnomus failed at
Agrigentum - and this extended past the Roman flanks also.
Hamilcar Barca, the overall commander, commanded the rest which was the
center formation. Hamilcar decided that the best way to defeat
Rome would be to withdrawl if the Romans attacked and hope to break up
their formation so that his flanks could use their maneuverability to
ram the Roman vessels.
The Romans fell to this trap as squadrons I and II moved foward to
pierce the Carthiginian center, which they perceived as weak.
Then Hamicalr ordered his center to turn and fight, and a rought melee
ensued, with some Carthiginian vessels successfully passing up the
Romans and then turning around to hit them astern. The Roman
squadrons I and II fought equally as determined, especially with both
consuls in the thick of the fighting. The right wing of the
Carthiginian fleet, commanded by Hanno, swept to the rear of the Roman
formation and hit squadron IV from behind. All the while the left
wing of the Carthaginian armada moved to hit the Roman III
squadron. Although Hamilcar succeeded in determining the sequence
of the battle he failed to gain an advantage and although he had
limited success in outmanuevering the corvus the Roman fleet was
still able to disable much of the Carthiginian shipping through the use
of the corvus. Soon after the Carthiginian center began to
flee, allowing the Roman vessels not pre-occupied with securing the
ships they had already grappled or captured to turn and aid with the
rest of the battle. Hanno, hitting the triarii in the rear
was soon the victim of a flanking Roman contingent, and he was forced
to flee, and consequently the Carthiginian left flank was sorrounded
and also forced to withdrawl. The Carthiginians escaped with the
bulk of their fleet, although sixty-four ships captured and thirty-four
sunk, meaning just under one third of their fleet was lost. The
Romans lost a mere twenty-four sunk.
Following the battle the Romans sailed back to Sicily for a rest and to
repair any damaged done. The Carthiginians had been
shattered. Following the quick rest the Roman fleet again set
sail south, and was able to reach the Carthiginian shore without any
major events. The Roman army was unloaded near the Carthiginian
city of Aspis, and Apsis itself soon besieged. The Roman navy was
beached with heavy defenses on the beachfront. Aspis fell soon
afterwards and the Romans decided to plunder the country side, most
likely for supplies. According to sources some twenty thousand
Carthaginian slaves were captured, some repordetly Italians captured
beforehand. Rome soon delivered a message ordering Vulso back to
Italy, while Regalus stay in Africa to oversee operations. So,
Regalus now commanded some fifteen thousand men with five hundred
horses, albeit understrength. To counter this Carthrage called
upon three commanders to forge an army around the city, including
Hadrubal (son of Hanno, the same to command the right wing at Ecnomus),
Bostar and Hamilcar (the main commander at Ecnomus). All the
while Regalus continued his advance and soon besieged Adys (who's
location is now unknown). However, the Carthigian generals
hurried to the area and set camp north of Adys. Regalus, noticing
a weakness in the Carthiginian camp, decided to storm it, and set out
to do just this. Regalus attacked either at dawn or at night, and
the only resistance he received was from a group of Carthiginian
mercenaries, although these were defeated, and the camp, consequently,
captured, with the bulk of the Punic army fleeing. This
Carthiginian defeat was most likely due to the fact that it had just
been conjured and that it did not have the experience to co-ordinate
effectively.
Therefore, Adys fell, and Regalus followed up with a capture of
Tunis. This put the city of Carthrage directly under threat and
Regalus was sure to mount raids of the country side around the
city. Carthrage soon requested peace talks, as it was also in a
war against the Numidians to their south and their had been food
shortages in Carthrage due to the massive amounts of refugees trying to
enter the city. The Romans, charactiristicly, introduced harsh
terms, and the Carthiginians denied them, and so the table talks ended.
During January and Febuary 255 B.C. Carthrage reformed their army, and
included a contingent of Spartan soldiers. Their leader,
Xangthippus, soon rose to advise the Carthiginian Army after he had
openly critisized the strategy used at Adys. In any case, twelve
thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and one hundred elephants
soon formed into an army in order to stop Regalus. The two armies
marched out to meet each other, the Punic commanders ready to regain
their honor, and the Romans eager to inflict another heavy defeat and
finally end the war. They camped at about a mile from each other
and both accepted battle the following day. The battle is thought
to have been held around Tunis, although it's exact location is a
mistery. Xanthippus put a phalanx, formed by citizens of
Carthrage, in the center, with mercenaries on the right. The two
wings were occupied by cavalry, and reinforced with skirmirshers, and
finally, the elephants formed as a shock corps. Regalus placed
his Velites ahead to skirmish, and the cavalry formed the wings,
with the infantry in the center, and this was made especially
deep. Furthermore, the Romans employed the usual triplex
acies, however the cavalry wings were not nearly strong enough.
Xanthippus gave the order for the elephant charge some time later and
the Velites moved to meet them. The Carthiginian horsemen
also moved to engage the Roman flanks, which were routed, and the
Carthiginians soon found themselves in a position to outflank the Roman
army. Although the elephants pressed the Roman infantry the
formation did not break and parts of the Roman center moved past the
elephants and engaged the center of the Carthiginian infantry
line. These were defeated in succession and the Carthiginian
cavalry moved to hit the Romans in the flanks. In a brief, but
very red, slaughter the Carthigians destroyed the Roman army, except
for five hundred men and Regalus himself - which were captured in any
case. Some other two thousand men, who had broken through the
mercenaries on the Carthiginian flank, were able to return to Aspis
avoiding capture or destruction.
Soon after the defeat the survivors left Africa and the fleet returned
to Italy. Although the invasion of Africa concluded in a heavy
defeat the Romans had been successful in the sense that they had
finally made their point that Carthrage was not safe, and they had been
able to apply pressure, and they had even been able to get Carthrage to
the peace tables. This would play into Roman hands later after
the war.
Polybius claims that the Roman navy that fought its battles against the
Carthiginians was built from a marooned model found on an Italic beach,
near Regium, where it had ran aground, originally sent to intercept
Roman forces heading from Italy to Sicily. The Romans immediately
called for their allies to build them a fleet using that ship.
It's also possible that the main center of construction was a single
harbor under Roman supervision, perhaps Ostia. The mass amounts
of ships were completed in sixty days, according to Pliny.
Therefore, it's much more likely that the construction of these ships
was spread throughout the allies of Rome, because it's very improbable
that single harbor, which was innexperienced in naval construction
construct so many ships in such short time. Most of the ships
that were to comprise the new fleet were quinqueremes, or
'fives'. Importantly, the Romans also improved the design with
the corvus, or the grapling bridge that could link a Roman ship
to an enemy, forcing the enemy to a hand to hand fight on their own
ship. Although it's said to be a detriment in actual naval combat
the time to close on a ship and push men to the enemy vessel would have
made up for any detriments, and subsequent Roman victories were
testament to these improvements.
It's not true that the Romans had never built a fleet prior to the
advent of the Carthiginian shipwreck. It's known that in 311 B.C.
the administration of Rome created a seperate board, duoviri navales
classis ornandae reficiendawque causa which would oversee the
construction of warships, and it's known that a squadron of these ships
was defeated at Tarentum in 282 B.C. The Romans also relied
heavily on ships supplied by their allies, as shown by the crossing to
Sicily in 264 B.C.
The fleet was put under the command of Cnaeus Cornelius Scipio, and
with seventeen ships he crossed to Messena to prepare logistical
supplies for his coming naval campaigns. Once there he was given
the chance to pay for the betrayal of Lipara, a strategic port city
which if captured would deny the Carthiginians of an extremely
important base. He set off to Lipara and occupied the
harbor. However, the Carthiginians launched a contingent of
twenty ships, under a nobleman called Boodes, and it maneuvered to
blockade the port and trap the Romans. The events that followed
ensured that the Romans would be defeated, and some crews even fled to
Sicily, possibly swimming the harbor's waters to reach the city.
Rome was forced to pay ransom for the release of Scipio, forever
branded Asina. However, the Romans had their vengeance
when the main fleet detroyed much of Hannibal's - the same Hannibal who
had defended Agrigentum - fifty ships, sailing for reconaissance
operations. After this the command of the fleet was given to
Caius Duilius. Furthermore, the corvus was employed around
this date for the first time, because the Romans needed another way of
defeating the Punic fleets, since the Roman equivalents were poorly
trained and not as maneuverable.
The Carthiginian fleet continued to raid coastal cities, including
Mylae. Duilius, receiving information of the Punic presence at
Mylae moved quickly and set out to meet the full force of the enemy
fleet. Hannibal replied with his own haughty maneuvers to meet
the Romans. Diodorus claims that Hannibal was at the head of two
hundred ships, however, Polybius claims one hundred and twenty, which
is much more believable. The Romans boasted some one hundred and
three. Hannibal rode on his flagship, a captured hepteres, or
'seven'. Although the presence of the corvus was strange
to Hannibal he continued, confident of his superiority. The
battle that ensued was very chaotic, with the Punic vessels rushing
foward, out of control, some ramming Roman ships. However, most
of the Roman warships managed to drop their corvi and the Roman
crews immediately put thirty ships out of action, including the
Hepteres, which was abondoned by Hannibal. The Carthiginians then
attempted a flanking manevuer to hit the Romans astern, however, the
Romans also proved astute and turned around and managed to drop their
corvi on these ships also. The Carthiginians again turned
to retreat, using their superior velocities to escape, however, the
battle had been a clear Roman success. Polybius claims fifty
ships lost for Hannibal, some thirty captured and some fifteen sunk.
Hannibal was not punished for this loss, however, he was executed by
his own men in Sardniania, after he was blockaded by another Roman
fleet. In 257 B.C. another major action occured of Tyndaris,
however, it ended in a Carthiginian withdrawl, and nothing decisive was
encountered.
The naval victory against Hannibal had given Rome the prestige it
needed to continue the war, and it would ensure that the Romans would
never be low on pride. Duilius built his own triumphal column,
although it no longer survives completely, and the Romans decorated the
Forum with the prows of captured Punic ships.
The Roman conquest of Messana provided the Roman armies deployed on
Sicily with a strong logistical base for further operations on the
island. Consequently, it can be safely assumed that the straits
between Italy and Sicily were extremely important to the Roman cause
and must have been littered with Roman shipping. However, neither
were the Carthiginians completely idle during this process, as they
were busy recruiting a fairly large army. Mercenaries were hired
from Spain, Gaul and even some Ligurians would be hired. In
reply, the Romans put a full force of four legions and both consuls on
Sicily by 262. In the summer of 262 the Romans moved to besiege
the Carthiginian logistical base at Agrigentum, and the Carthiginians
had failed to reinforce the city with the main body of their army.
The Romans invested Agrigentum, which was commanded by a general named
Hannibal (not the famed Hannibal of the Second Punic War, mind you),
with all four legions, and camped about a mile from the city, and sent
a large part of their force to sweep over the land for supplies and
such. Taking this oppurtunity Hannibal sallied with tenacity and
scattered the foragers, and the Carthiginians changed axis to march on
the Roman camp, which was met by fierce resistance at a picket
line. However, this was crushed and the Carthiginians continued
onto the camp, where he was routed, despite heavy Roman
casualties. The fighting in the camp ensued as a second group of
Carthiginians jabbed at the camp soon after, although this too was
defeated, and the Romans chased the enemy back to the city walls.
This would be hard learned lesson for both sides. The consuls
decided on blockading the city for the rest of the year, and the
occupying Roman army immediately set up on digging ditches and
constructing forts along the perimeter of the city, completely cutting
Agrigentum off from the rest of Sicily, and lucky for the Romans the
city lacked a harbor, meaning the Carthiginian navy could not
effectively re-supply Agrigentum. Five months later the
Carthiginians finally landed the bulk of their forces at a site named
Heraclea Minoa, twenty miles upcoast from Agrigentum, immediately
putting the Roman army in threat. According to Diodorus this army
had a strength of sixty war elephants, fifty thousand infantry and six
thousand cavalry, which put this army, under the command of General
Hanno, at a advantage over the Romans.
Hanno was quick to strike at the Roman supply dump at Herbesus and
severed ties to this logistical base, casuing manifold problems in the
Roman lines, including disease. Hanno continued and decided to
engage the Roman army, sending his Numidian Horsemen to engage the
Roman cavalry, which eagerly followed. The Numidians immediately
retreated drawing the Roman cavalry to chase them, and once they had
reached the main lines the Numidians promptly turned around and crushed
the isolated Roman cavalry, sending them in tatters back to Roman
lines. Hanno then marched and set up camp about a mile and half
from the Roman's own camp, and he eagerly deployed for battle, however,
the Romans declined. Days later, pressed by supply problems, the
Romans marched out and offered Hanno his fight, however, he declined,
weary of this sudden change of heart in the Roman
army. In the end, both suffering food shortages,
deployed for battle soon after.
The battle remains in relative obscurity but contemporary sources
indicate that the Roman infantry line moved foward and enganged the
first Carthiginian line, and using their cavalry, which had been
previously mauled, they pushed back the Carthiginian wings, prompting
the first Carthiginian line to rout, which subsequently sent the entire
army into flight, and the Romans rapidly persued. Carthiginian
losses were cited at three thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry,
and the Romans had lost about thirty thousand infantry and five hundred
and forty cavalry throughout the entire siege, although he claims a
total Roman army of one hundred thousand. Consequently, it was
more likely that the Roman army was at forty thousand men, which was
the theoritical number for four legions, placing Roman casualties at
around ten thousand or less, although it is not certain. Hanno
was been critisized for not using his elephants properly, but
historians suggest that elephants had not been a custom of the
Carthiginian military until recently and Hanno lacked the experience to
deploy these to full effect. Also, relatively new, and recruited
from different sections of the Carthiginian sphere of influence, the
army did not have the time to learn how to coordinate with each other,
and they certainly did not know how to work with each other, meaning
that they most likely lacked coordination of the battlefield,
contributing to this defeat. Hannibal took another opportunity,
this time to flee, and attempted to break out during the Roman
festivities for the victory, and it seems he left unhindered, although
the Romans entered Agrigentum the next morning, and saced the city,
enslaving the local population. Polybius notes that this success
pushed the senate to escalate the war fund, and thereby escalate the
war itself.
The art of siege warfare quickly unravelled itself in front of the eyes
of the Romans who came close to a crushing defeat at Agrigentum.
They had entered the war with non-existant siege technology, and they
would soon learn that this was crucial to a successful siege of a large
and well defended city. Up to now, most sieges required scaling
the walls with the advantage of full suprise. However, it was
much more common that the city was merely handed over through
treachery, such as bribing, or opening of the city gates. The
battle in front of the gates of Agrigentum would be the first of only
four pitched battles throughout the entire First Punic War. However, it
was a testament to the grim nature of the war, and it proved that this
war would not be one in a single swift campaign. It truly shook
both sides up, and taught them powerful lessons in the art of war.
In the end the Romans merely brought more men from the Italian
mainland, and the Carthiginians began to prepare for their own campaign
by amassing supplies and men in Sicily. The Carthiginians would
also learn to use the power of their fleet to their own advantage -
another aspect of war the Romans would have to grow into.
The Carthiginian Military fielded little of the citizen body into the
infantry service since the citizen body was both extremely small, and
untrained for war. Although sometimes they served as infantrymen,
they were normally armed with a phalanx type armament, and served as
such, with poor results. Such an army was defeated by the
Syracusan Agathocles. They were not distinguished fighters, and
most citizens were reserved for the Carthiginian Navy, which boasted to
be one of the best in the Mediterranean Sea. The harbor of
Carthrage itself was said to hold a circular harbor which berthed one
hundred and eighty ships, and it is very likely that many crews were
permament.
In any case, the Carthiginian Army was based mostly on foreign
contingents, from areas conquered by the city or directly
influenced. It is known that the Carthiginians recruited heavily
from Numidia and other parts of Lybia for their horsemen and these
cavalry were reknown for their abilities in battle - a major example
their prowess would come up later at Cannae in 216 B.C.E. The
Carthiginians also recruited from Spain and other areas for their
infantry, which were armed with large shields and with either a gladius
styled stabbing sword or a slashing sword - although the recruits were
armed with their home armaments. In return for their service the
Carthiginians would pay their fighters and would reward the tribal
leader of whom these warrios belonged to, thus establishing a
quasi-feudal system. The Carthiginians were known to make
alliances with the tribes they recruited from, and were extremely hurt
if some of these tribes rebelled. This latter fact seems to
connote that the Carthiginians had a similar diplomatic system to that
of Rome. They 'allied' with the neighbors, however, forged some
sort of superiority over them, and imposed their will when they wanted
to, which sometimes, most likely, became highly tyrannical, prompting
revolts. It is also possible that these 'allies' were willing to
change sides as time passed, depending on who seemed to be winning.
However, the one strength of the Carthiginian Army over the Roman Army
was the fact that Carthiginian generals normally led their armies for
the entire progression of the campaign, thus banding armies together
and creating a common identity. This was lacked in the Roman
Army, as generals were most likely only for the year, as the most
generals were also consuls, and the term for consuls was annual.
The Carthiginian Navy was something on the other side of the
hill. It was superior to the early Republican Navy of Rome.
However, through the First Punic War the Romans would soon learn the
trick of the trade and make their own navy able to withstand that of
the Carthiginians and in fact surpass it. However, the fact
remains that the Carthiginians started the war with a far superior
navy, both in technology and numbers. The mainstay of the navy
was most likely the trireme, and it also sported quinquereme, as well
as some sixers, and sometimes even larger ships, although exact numbers
are not available and how they were manned is lost to history.
All in all, a full break down on the Carthiginian military is almost
impossible to construct with the sources available to a simple
historian and a better look would require some archeological evidence,
which I do not have access to, or the monetary resources to conduct my
own search of history.
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NOTE: This is one of those that I can use some help on... if you have any information please PM me.
Rome, according to a widely accepted legend, was founded by Romulus on
the banks of the Tiber in 753 B.C.E., and it is most likely that
Romulus merely incorporated an already existing band of tribal people
and settled the area. History then tells that the city of Rome
lacked the existance of women, thus setting the stage of Rome's
earliest conflict, the rape of the Sabine women - where the Romans
invited their Sabine neighbor's, at least the men, to a festival in
Rome, and in the absense of the men, the Romans raided the Sabine
village and took the women for themselves. Throughout the rest of
the monarchy, seven kings in all, the Etruscans would play a big role
in the developement of Rome, and had it not been for them the Romans
may have never gotten past the village state to become a great city in
central Italy. The Romans continued their wars into the era of
the Republic as vividly narrated by Livy and Appian. The Romans
fought several wars with their neighbors and fought three brutal wars
with the Samnites. The Gauls were able to sack Rome in 390 B.C.E.
after the Roman army was routed at the Battle of Allia. After
this the Latin cities rebelled against Rome and the Romans were able to
supress this after a long war, and after that they set the pattern for
the absorbing of the other Italian cities, which they would continue
for centuries to come.
Originally the Romans had equipped a hoplite army, taken from Etruscan
and Greek influence, and this would provide problems since the hoplites
were mostly land owners, and needed to return to Rome to plant and till
their lands - the same problems which arose in Greece and other areas
of the world. During the turn of the 4th Century the Romans began
to develope a standing army, as they adapted a system of payment to
keep their men fighting wars as the wars were fought over greater
expanses. It is evident that the Romans attempted to expand their
base of conscription to all citizens of Rome, or at least those which
owned land, although some administrations allowed even the land less to
join, although the full implimintation of this would not become
standard until the advent of Gaius Marius circa 100 B.C.E.
However, the Romans were able to conscript fairly large and well
trained armies - at least, larger than their enemies.
The Roman Army was built around a legio, which originally meant
levy. However, by the Third Century the Roman Republican Army
began to organize into complex tiers. The consular armies would
form into a series of lines, with the hastati to the fore, which
were the youngest conscripts, the principes in the center, since
they had more experience, and the triarii in the rear, as the
heavy and most experienced infantry. Each line had ten maniples,
a maniple consisting of one hundred and twenty men, although the
triarii maniples only consisted of sixty men. A century was
composed of five maniples, each led by a Centurion, although the
centuries did not act together - the basic tactical unit was the
maniple. The second in commands were the optios and other
officers included the signifier, and the
tesserarius. Although many Roman and Greek historians
which narrated the wars between Rome and Carthrage tell of Roman
conhorts this unit was not used until the late Republic, possibly after
Marius.
Each man would employ a scutum, or a round cylindrical shield
covering most of the body, and it was constructed in three layers of
plywood, and covered with calf-skin, making it very flexible, yet
incredibly strong. A boss was located in the center to hold the
shield together and provide some protection for the hand holding the
shield. At this time most Roman armor was made of bronze,
including a bronze helmet, bronze greaves, and a bronze cuirass.
Most helmets also incorporated a thick crest, most phsycological
purposes. Some of the wealthier soldiers sported mail
armor. The Romans were mostly swordsmen, and used a stabbing
sword, although it wouldn't be until after the First Punic War
that the gladius, or the Spanish designed stabbing blade, was
adopted. The principes and the hastati were give
one or two pilum which they normally let loose on the ranks of
enemies before charging in to deplete enemy ranks. The
triarii retained their thrusting spears. The pilii
were designed as to put most of the weight on the metal tip, thereby
giving it the strength to puncture through enemy armor, and at some
point the tip was changed to make it bend on impact, thereby rendering
it useless for use by the enemy. If the pilum did not kill
an enemy its weight on an enemy shield would render the enemy shield
useless, or a burden. A fourth infantry type, the velities
were mostly skirmishers armed with a short stabbing sword, later the
gladius, and with many throwing spears (it is important to note
that these were not the pilii.). Their were about twelve
hundred velites to three thousand infantry. As a cavalry
wing the Romans incorporated three hundred horsemen, divided into ten
turmae, each led by a decurion. This cavalry was
recruited from the wealthier citizens of Rome, just like the knits of
the Middle Ages would be rallied. The Roman cavarly suffered
somewhat from inneffective tactics as they primarily provided an early
charge - which would not prove to be enough, especially during the
Second Punic War. The Romans also relied heavily on allied
armies, and these provided the flanks of the Roman Consular
Armies. The allies provided some nine hundred cavalry to a
legion, and about a similar amount of infantry. Their armaments
is largely unknown, although it can be assumed that they were most
probably similar to the Roman army. A Roman army was commanded by
six tribunes although they did not share command - pairs
commanded on seperate days.
Roman officers were chosen from experience which would give a certain
edge to the Roman armies. Agression in battled was rewarded, and
certain rewards for given in battle, just like the Greeks did centuries
before. For example, those who scaled the walls of a city first
would be given certain priveliges, or a hefty amount of extra
payment. The Romans were very good in getting the best of their
men, and they kept a very strict discipline on their army. It is
said that if a soldier, or a group of soldiers, failed to behave
properly the officers would line their men up and one in every ten men
would be either flogged or executed - although the former was most
likely the more popular alternitive. This was termed
decimation and is the root of the word in the English vocabulary
today.
In most times the Romans fielded four legions, two for each consul,
plus the needed alae, or allied wings. However, sometimes,
as seen later, the Senate would not hesitate to raise more if
needed. The Senate never allowed for a legion to be given a sense
of unity, and changed the names and numbers about every year, or couple
of years - this would hamper preformance in upcoming battles.
The Romans also took great advantage in their 'moving
fortifications.' It is said that the Romans first employed
fortified camps until after the Pyrrhic Wars. The Romans were
defeated twice, and heavily, during the wars, once at Heraclea, and
then at Asculum. However, the clever M. Curius Dentatus, a consul
in the year 275, was able to defeat Pyrrhus by building a fortified
camp to his rear and use it as a focal point to unleash charges and
counter charges into the Greek lines - thereby, everytime he was thrown
back he would rally around this fort and hit again. This battle
at Beneventum decisively defeated the Greek cities of Southern Italy
and Pyrrhus of Epirus. These 'marching camps' soon began to be
designed for deep penetrations into enemy lines, and allowed very
organized logistical supply lines. They were built for the
offensive, however, they had their defensive values. These camps
ended up securing conquered land, and they were used as rallying points
during defeats in battle, as shown at the Battle of Beneventum.
If besieged the defenses would provide ample enough to stemie the tide
and defeat their opponents. As Vegetius said in the
4th Century C.E., the camp "gave the soldiers a place of
safte...". These camps would prove to be very valuable in
the upcoming campaigns.
All in all, the Roman Army was a well trained military machine.
However, it suffered from a common indentity, and it suffered from
poorly trained military leaders. Although the officers did have
experience the consular generals did not receive training and fought
with their own improvised, or self taught, military tactics and
strategies. Although sometimes this proved ample, other times it
proved fatal.
Note: This will actually take me a long time. Feel
free to post comments and suggestions - I will pay heed to them.
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Part I: The First Punic War
Chapter I: Crimson Streaks of War
Between 315-312 B.C.E. Agathocles, a Syracusan general, marched to and
captured the city of Messana, on the island of Sicily. This
tyrant relied heavily on mercenaries, and this band of hired warriors
would soon be the focal point of the causes of the epic war to
come. Agathocles was known to hire Oscan speaking Campanians,
which would later call themsleves Mamertines, after the god Mamer, God
of War. Agathocles died in the year 289 and the Mamertines, after
failing to be re-employed, were admitted into Messana. However,
these soldiers soon overthrew the local government in a coup de etat
and massacred the populace to use the city as a logistical base of
operations to launch attacks on neighbors, thereyb guaranteeing tribute
- therefore, a steady flow of income for other, more brutal military
campaigns. Rhegium, a city across the Straits of Messana (later
to be known as Messina) was also taken control by Oscan speaking
Campanians, who had followed suit after learning of the progress made
by their comrades across the water. However, these were former
employees of the Roman Republican Army, and after the Romans were
finished with Pyrrhic they sent an expidition to crush Rhegium, in
271. The Romans lay siege to the city, opened the defenses, and
slaughtered all but three hundred of the men. Those who were
spared were sent back to Rome in chains, and then publicly beheaded to
show to all what happened when Rome was betrayed.
In any case, in Sicily Pyrrus launched an expidition to defend the
Greeks, and a similar fate was given to this army as the army launched
agaisnt Rome - very spectacular, but ultimately unsuccessful. The
Mamertines did not aid and continued their raids agaisnt their
neighbors. In Syracuse, though, a new general, named Hiero, took
control and marched north to battle the Oscan speaking Mamertines, and
at the Battle of River Cyamosorus his was able to fight to a draw,
which was later to develope into a crushing victory at the Battle of
River Longanus. This effectively defeated Mamertine military
power and the Messana was quick to send envoys to Carthrage and Rome
for immediate aid, seeing their days numbered. The Carthiginians
responded fairly rapidly and in ernest and occupied Messana to defend
it from Syracuse. This had adverse political effect. The
Syracusan military had always been a thorn in the side of the
Carthiginians and they had battled to stop Carthiginian encroaching in
Sicily, to stop the total take over of the island by these North
Africans. Thus, the Carthiginians had effectively checked
Syracuse's attempt to enlarge its influece, as Hiero refused to take
action against the Carthiginians, and thus abondoned his campaign north.
In Rome, the senate analyzed this news closely. A Carthiginian
dominion of Messana gave them almost unrestricted access to the Italian
peninsula, and the Romans saw this as an extremely plausable
threat. Helping against Carthrage, and at the same time ending
Herio's reign, would allow the Romans to show their new Greek vassals
in Southern Italy who was the stronger man. This fear of a
Carthiginian invasion was not as farfetched as may seem.
Carthiginian administrators had been extremely imperialistic in the
last years, as shown by their relentless expansion in Sicily, and the
Romans did not want to face the prospect of another Pyrric like
invasion of Italy.
In 264 B.C.E. consul Appius Claudius Caudex provided the momentum for
the consequent approval of an expidition to Sicily, in which he would
receive the command. Claudius was most probably driven by greed,
ambition, and the prospect of being the first Roman to command an
overseas expidition. To persuade the people and the senate he
promised victory, and vast quantities of loot. The wealthier
citizens quickly moved to support the movement, as they would profit
intensely from selling their products to supply the Roman expulsion of
Carthrage and the Greeks from Sicily. The venture, although
oppurtunistic, was very logical for a nation so ambitious for
Mediterranean power. Their is evidence that this was not the
first time the Romans had thought about such an expidition, as years
earlier they had secured an alliance with Ptolemy II of Egypt, gaining
access to Egypt's timber, and they had confiscated allied forests in
Italy - perhaps, to build a fleet? Adrian Goldsworthy repeats
that Rome did not expend a drawn out war with Carthrage, and that the
Senate wanted only a minimized conflict. However, this was better
due to the Roman superiority complex, expecting the consular armies to
merely slaughter anything thrown in their way. It would be a
gross overexxageration, as they would soon be proven. However, it was
strange that the Romans were helping the Mamertimes,
the same 'race' of warriors that had betrayed Rome's trust at Rhegium
and it seemed very hypocritical, and the senate was very well aware of
this. This only adds to the piling evidence that the war to come
was one of self-interest, and not a mind of justice, although the
Romans would play it as such.
As the Romans spent the time to prepare their army, as it took some
time to enlist soldiers and train them, the Carthiginians sent a fleet
to begin patrolling of the Straits. Using trimeres given to Rome
by their Italian allies they began to cross the Straits soon after,
however, daylight attempts were intercepted by Carthiginian shipping,
although any prisoners were promptly returned, perhaps to avoid war
with Rome. However, at a certain point Claudius was able, under
the cover of darkness, to move men to Messana, and somehow persuade the
Mamertines to evict the Carthiginians. The Carthiginian general,
Hanno, would be beheaded by his own countrymen for this failure.
After this Claudius brought the rest of his army over across the
straits and on to Sicily. Resulting from this was a Carthrage
willing to, out of the blue, ally with Hiero. Hiero soon sent an
expidition which rondevouzed with a Carthiginian force outside Messana
and lay siege to it, and blockaded the city. Sometime later
Claudius led a raiding party, mostly cavalry, and plundered the
Syracusan camp, ensuing in a sharp battle where the Syracusan cavalry,
known for their martial abilities, were able to defend from the Roman
attack successfully until Claudius brought up some of his infantry
reserves which promptly put the Syracusan army to flight. Soon
after Hiero began his march back home. The next day
Claudius hit the Carthiginians in what seems like a suprise attack and
drove them off too, resulting in a double victory for the Roman
expedition. Claudius then raided Syracusan territory, laying
waste to the land, in a show of force. However, by the end of the
year his term as consul had expired and he left Sicily for Rome.
In 263 consuls Marcus Valerius Maximums and Manius Otacilius Crassus
were both sent to Sicily with some forty thousand soldiers. This
fairly large Roman army proved enough to cause a certain number of
cities on Sicily to defect from Carthrage and Syracuse, and this was
only augmented by quick suprise attacks and treachery. The Romans
marched for Syracuse soon after and most of the above force was sent to
subdue Hiero. The witty Syracusan king quickly moved for peace
with Rome, which was accepted by the Romans, who truly did not want to
attempt a brutal siege of one of the better defended cities of the
island. It is also likely that the logistical preperations were
not sufficient to keep up with such a rapid, and drawn out advance,
which was caused both by Roman unpreparedness and Carthiginian actions
in the Straits. Hiero would remain allied to Rome for all, or
most, of the remainder of the First Punic War.
More importantly, however, the stage was set for the two superpowers of
the area, Rome and Carthrage, to duke it out for control of
Sicily. The war, or wars, to follow would be long, harsh, and
unpleasant for all sides.
How the conflict began would do well in explaining how the conflict
would be fought, and the styles shown by all sides would dictate the
fluidity of the coming war. The Romans, as always, would rely on
large numbers to give them an advantage on the battlefield, and the
Carthiginians would attempt to take a route which encompassed the long
run. These different styles were created by centuries of warfare,
and the responsibility to describe the difference of both armies, and
the evolution of both armies, lies in the next chapters.
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