Could the Minor Asian campaign have worked?

As you may know, between 1919 and 1922, Greece launched a campaign into Asia Minor (Anatolia), in an effort to occupy and annex parts of Anatolia's western regions.

Initially, under the Sevres treaty, signed by the Entente and the Ottoman empire, the area around Smyrna (Izmir), was to be autonomous, and decide with a referendum if it wanted to be part of Greece or Turkey (Ottoman Empire). The Greek army was to guarantee the autonomity and internal security in the region.
Greece soon found out that they were not welcome in Anatolia by the muslim population, while also a revolutionary faction, under Mustafa Kemal, was taking military action against the Sevres treaty (that included fighting with Armenians, French and British). Turkish armed groups started harassing the Greek army, and the Greek army took action by steadily expanding it's positions, beyond the Smyrna region.
In winter 1920-1921, and spring 1921, the Greek army attacked, in order to destroy the turkish armed group, only to find that they had underestimated the turkish forces (which were organized and trained as a regular army) and that the Greek forces in Anatolia were insufficient for the task. From March to June 1921, Greece transported reinforcements, in order to increase the Army of Asia Minor to sufficient stength. In June 1921 the Greek army undertook a major offensive towards Kutahya and Eski Sehir, with the aim of encircling and destroying the Turkish army. The Greek forces advanced deep into the east, and caused much attrition to the Turkish forces, but they (the Turkish) were able to escape the Greek maneuvre, and retreat east of the river Saggarios (Sakarya). Facing the failure of their plan, the Greek high command decided to continue the attack, crossing the river, towards Ankara, the capital of the Turkish Revolutionaries. The plan was essentially the same as with June-July, namely the Greek army would try to encircle and destroy the Turkish army. The campaign was found to be very difficult, as the army had extended its supply routes too much. Additionally, Turkish cavalry was causing havoc in greek supply columns. The Greek plan for the attack was also very faulty, while the Greek military leadership was found very incapable, comparing infavourably with the much more potent Turkish leadership. The battle resulted into a bloody failure, and the Greek army retreated orderly towards the west expecting an imminent Turkish counterattack (which didn't occur).
By autumn 1921, the Greek economy, weak already from the beginning, collapsed. The "Allies" refused any loan to Greece. Facing this reality, it became evident in Greece that the war was lost, as the Army had lost any capabilities to launch a big offensive again. An immediate evacuation was unthinkable, as it would have a tremendous political effect, leading the government certainly to a fall. A financial trick (internal lending) by the minister of Economy gave additional life to the Greek Army, until the autumn of 1922, with the possibility of a medium offensive. This offensive was decided to be against Constantinople in summer 1922, but for political reasons it never materialized. Proposed plans for the creation of a "Minor Asian State" had no chances of success.
Eventually, in August 1922, a powerfull Turkish offensive broke the Greek Army in two parts, with the biggest being encircled and effectively destroyed. In relative disarray, the Greek Army evacuated Anatolia, into the Aegean islands and Eastern Thrace.
The "Allies", with no Greek representative, signed a cease-fire agreement with Turkey in Mudania (Mudanya). According to this agreement, the Greek Army had to evacuate Eastern Thrace, something that caused great resentment to the Greek side. A military "revolution", among the ranks of the Greek Army had overthrown and arrested the government (and eventually executed them, after a parody-trial), and amidst these internal developments it was decided that Greece should sign the embarassing agreement. Greece later reorganized her army, and prepared for continuation of war, but the Turkish withdrawal of the demand that Greece pay war-reparations made Greece accept eventually the agreement, and leave Eastern Thrace to Turkey.
Thus, the war ended.

My big question, as a Greek, which I honestly don't know the answer is: had the campaign any chance of success?
Because, according the many historians, including Winston Churchill, Greece did not have enough potential (men, money, weapons) to occupy and defend such a large territory, against a determined enemy, with greater human resources, fighting in his own territory.
Others, (...mostly Greeks), seem to believe either that 1)if Greece had not extended the campaign beyond Smyrna she would be able to defend and annex the smyrna region, or 2)if Greece had taked serious action earlier (in 1919 or 1920) when the Turkish forces were weak, she would be able to eliminate the Kemalist movement. Others think that the capture of Constantinople (Istanbul) would be enough to pressure Kemal into an agreement with Greece.

What do you think? I know the Turkish member will say "Nah, we would destroy you anytime", but seriously, was there a way, that Greece could win something of this war?

The only way to win would be:

a)Have support of the Allies (real support in guns and money)
b) Fortify the Smyrni area and fight a trench war

And still it woud be difficult.

Good post Bey.

Hello to you all

I wish that Eastern Thrace including Constantinople would still be in Greek hands.

As to amphibious assaults, yes, I think Greece could have defended the Western side of Istanbul. However, it would not be easy with a million Turks behind your lines. I guess they would be ethnically cleansed ASAP. Which would result in Greeks being ethnically cleansed from Anatolia.

In this particular case, I think there's no doubt a population exchange (=mutual ethnic cleansing) would take place.

Ismet Inonu puts a special emphasis on the latter. He wrote that the Greeks, lacking 'Great War experience' found it unnecessary to have heavy artillery, and believed that their field artillery would be sufficient, on the other hand the Turks did everything they could to get some heavy artillery in place for the offensive, they had to repair the uncommissioned ones by the Allies even.

Heavy artillery played a crucial role in the last turkish offensive. But I don't think Greece underestimated the value of heavy artillery. Simply, with the existing situation, Greece was unable to obtain any heavy artillery.

Originally posted by Count Belisarius Did the turks have anything in the way of an air force and and armored cavalry? and how good were the turkish and greek logistics? what about the greek navy

afaik tanks or armoured cars were not widely used or used at all. air force existed and was important in the victory of the Turks. also Turks had a cavalry corps (and i mean real cavalry) under Hayrettin Pasha which also was crucial to victory. the Turkish War of Independence was not fought in the tradition of ww1 but in the new way of mobile warfare as seen in the Russian Civil War that would later predominate in ww2.

Originally posted by xristar    King Constantine himself had said that the Greeks of Anatolia do not deserve freedom.

BTW what do you mean by real cavalry?

Originally posted by Count Belisarius Temujin    What use would cavalry be in the 1920's? not to sound close minded or anything but wouldn't a few good rifles reduce them to a reddish paste?

Fast moving  infantry. Essential in the vast uncontrolled areas of anatolia.