How Consistent Was Bismarck In His Aims And Methods

I prefer to consider it a Bismarckian contribution to the economy of the Baltic littoral.

Come on, how about that Bismarckian foreign policy?

Russia, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, France...........

OK...here goes, but correct any mistakes of fact....which there likely are.

Bismarck saw two potential enemies of Germany, France and Russia.  He, and the Emperor, Wilhelm I, also saw a monarchical affinity between Russia and the class from which he came, that of rural Prussia.  His obvious choice was an understanding with Russia that would be nurtured and preserved as far as possible.  France was the danger even after the downfall of 1870/71.  After that, the French Empire fell into disrepute, and socialist forces became stronger there (Paris commune, etc.), and did not evaporate after the suppression of the commune or the withdrawal of German forces.

The rise of socialism and the possibility of war were the domestic and international issues that mattered most to Bismarck.  In this, he had plenty of company in XIXc. society.  Some Germans wanted a return of  monarchy in France and a throwback to the settlement of 1815.  Bismarck disagreed.  If France, as a hotbed of socialism and revolution, could be isolated, the monarchies of Europe might work against her interests to the benefit of Germany, keeping her less able to form dangerous anti-German alliances.....for the revanchism, etc.  He saw it as a way to keep France weaker than before the German Empire.  Popular, republican rule was seen as disuniting, and France would demonstrate it's weakness.

His triumph was the congress of Berlin where, on German soil, the powers made arrangements for the Balkans that were in their own interests (what would we have expected them to do?), and Bismarck was able to take credit for a "great" international settlement.  Russia was actually weakened by the Berlin agreements, as her victory over Turkey (more for national pride and pan-Slavism) actually weakened her position in the Balkans.  Now with Turkey so diminished, there was no real buffer between Russia, driving toward the Straits, and the British Royal Navy that could check that.  By this means, Bismarck also saw an advantage in lessening Russian threats against Austria-Hungary and also potentially against Germany.  V-e-r-y Realpolitik.

I think his main diplomatic strategy was twofold:

First, isolate and hopefully discredit republican France.

Second, while expressing monarchical solidarity with Russia, try to work with Austria-Hungary (also a monarchical ally in the Dreikaiserbund) to limit Russian moves in the Balkans, while reminding Russia that the British were always in the picture in the eastern Mediterranean....kind of a double threat to keep your monarchical "friend" at bay, and less of a threat.

This is over-simplified, but it is the way I see it.  Other thoughts?

Oh, BTW, Bismarck did see the dangers in the hornets nest of the Balkans.  I don't think he thought Germany had much chance to do anything about that except keep a lid on it. 

Originally posted by pikeshot1600 Isn't anyone else interested in discussing this further?  Like Otto who started it?

Guess not......too bad.

I can't believe you guys in the Balkans are not interested in getting into this.  The Eastern Question still hasn't been answered! 

The whole colonial enterprise was a waste....it had become "the thing to do" among the powers (even Belgium), and there was never any hope of Germany being able to defend any colonial interests against either Britain or France.  Bismarck used the enthusiasm to his advantage as much as he could in domestic and diplomatic affairs.

The old Anglo-Prussian, or Anglo-German affinity was much reduced by the rise of the German Empire, and as you say, the industrial development of a rival to British strength.

The main point in international affairs after the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was the Balkans....weakening of Turkey and rising nationalism among their subject peoples, and the inevitable clash of interests of Austria and Russia as they exerted more influence in this region.

The 1880s were, I think very troubling for Germany.  The General Staff began to be the most powerful institution in the nation, eventually becoming the virtual government of germany in around 1905/06.  Socialism increased as industrialism increased, and Bismarck, who was getting old, had no answer for socialist activities and demands other than to consider supression as a solution.  His hold on the Foreign Office was strong, but not absolute, and there were career officials there who did not share his view in regard to Russia as a "friend."  The army also had reasons to consider war against Russia before they became more powerful or accepted French proposals for an alliance.  It did not happen then, but the opinion was there.

Wilhelm II felt the need to be his own man, and was a military "wannabe" who was influenced by the attitudes of the General Staff.  When some internal administrative and political problem arose, he dismissed Bismarck in 1890, and the alliance with Russia was not renewed.  If Bismarck had a diplomatic weakness it was the very complex alliances he constructed with all sorts of secret agreements and other deviousness.  It was perhaps too complicated for succesors to deal with.  

It is not so fashionable to dwell on the importance of personalities in history, but I feel it is important to emphasize that there was no one who could fill Bismarck's place in Germany.  Love him, hate him or whatever, he was a titanic person...brilliant, opportunistic; cynical, crude and vindictive (especially at the Foreign Office), he was a titan replaced by a succession of educated, urbane and ineffectual dwarves.   

Maju:

Do you see the prelude to the First World War as more a competition for economic benefit rather than as a tide of nationalistic feeling that could not be resisted? Or, was it a combination of the two?

Other possible reasons?

I do not agree than the Balkans were a colonial adventure.  From the 1870s to 1913, several new sovereign states (some artificially devised by the Powers [Albania]) were established.  They were not colonies of the Powers, although they were influenced by them.  The national populations of Serbia or Bulgaria would not have stood for 'colonial' status any more.

Bismarck's policy up until 1890 had more to do with Germany's eastern and western borders and security rather than projecting power into the Balkans.  In 1914, Germany was dragged into the Balkans by her weaker ally Austria when there was no vital interest for Germany.  Bismarck saw the danger and folly of having to face two powerful enemies, Russia east and France west, rather than trying to keep Russia as happy as possible and occupied in the Balkans where there were three possible adversaries for the Russians to contend with. (Turk/A-H/Brit.)

I agree that the conflict there was inevitable...regardless of diplomacy. 

Maju, this is interesting, and thanks for showing your interest.

On the issue of why Germany turned her back on Bismarck's policy of "friendship" with Russia, I'll try here.

Social and other realities had changed a lot since the 1870s.  Bismarck, seeing his goals mostly achieved, and getting older, did not change much.  His main fear was a "two front" conflict with France and Russia, as we have discussed.  By the late 1880s, three important changes had taken place:

First, economic expansion had brought more wealth to Germany, the middle classes expanded and public opinion became more an issue than before.  Bismarck, not being middle class, never quite recognized that  only the more rural parts of eastern Prussia were any longer like Russia.  Also, as the General Staff became more and more influential, new attitudes developed.  About half of the officers on the GS were bourgeois, and they reflected their class attitudes as Bismarck reflected his.

Second, you have mentioned the drive for colonies (in Germany's case mostly as prestige) and overseas commercial interest.  For Germany to realize "her place" among the world powers, as opposed to Europe, friendly relations with Britain were seen as more important than with Russia.  Bismarck had feared Russia at Germany's back.  The new attitude was that the army thought they could deal with that, and the Germans wanted Britain as their new friend.  With Russian moves threatening the Mediterranean and Suez, and also Afghanistan and India, there was no way Germany could have it both ways....it was one or the other.

Also, Germany gained favor with Britain by more strongly, and openly, supporting Austria as a counter to Russia in the Balkans.  It was all starting to be apparent that a big change was coming.

Third, the new kaiser was more in line with this thinking, colonial prestige, a navy like Britain, etc., and from 1888, it was doom for the old policy.  In 1890, Bismarck was forced out, the treaty with Russia was not renewed, and Anglo-German relations were quite good.  

I don't know if Britain was complacent about a German naval threat (that didn't really exist) at the time, but as the German naval buildup proceeded around 1900-1905, they realized the threat.....voila, raprochement with France, agreement with Russia...Triple Entente....world war caused by "some damn fool thing in the Balkans."

It almost gives you a headache.

Maju:

Thanks for the info on the game.  Sounds cool.

Britain did not cause Germany to non-renew the treaty with Russia in 1890.  Germany did that on her own.  I do not think there was any movement toward a formal treaty with Britain, Germany gambling that what they were doing (disassociating with Russia; supporting Austria against Russian interests in the Balkans) would move Britain closer to Germany.  They were quite mistaken.  In 1892, the new governmant in Britain ended that dream.  Thereafter, Germany was left with a possible two-front strategic problem, and their later naval build-up was seen by Britain as a grave threat.

The first "entente" partners were France and Russia in the earlier 1890s.  Britain did not come into that picture until around 1908.  Supposedly, if Germany had not violated Belgian neutrality, just across the English Channel, Britain would have had no cause for war, but I do not believe that she would have remained neutral for very long.  The entente was an odd partnership on many levels.

Remember, by the time Britain became an entente member, Russia had been soundly defeated in the Far East by Japan (1904/05), revolutionary activity was percolating close to the surface (1905), and the Russians needed all the help they could get if they had to force the issue with Austria in the Balkans, and face Germany as well.  Russian attention had been refocused on the Balkans after they were checked in Asia....Britain could hurt or help Russia, and it was better if they helped.

"No permanent friends; no permanent enemies...just permanent (mostly) vital national interests." 

Italy joined the "Triple Alliance" (Germany, A-H, [later Turkey]) as an ally (not sure when).  That could keep France occupied on her southern border and in the Mediterranean.

I would have to research the reasons that led Italy to join...like what was in it for them.  You would think Italy surely would want to have stayed on good terms with Britain with all the strategic interests of Britain in the Med.  There is a little project I guess.

Of course Italy was never a very committed member of that alliance....neutral in 1914, and on the "Entente" side in 1915. 

The Italians have managed to wind up on the winning side more often than not.