Top 100 Generals

 

I support Hannibal the Great in his decision. Scipio was an exceptional commander and tactician. Ilipa was one of the most tactically brilliant battles of the Ancient World - He basically won the battle before it even started due to the formation in which he arranged his legions and spanish allies into. The different speeds at which they advanced just about sent Hasdrubal Gisco and his forces into disarray. Scipio was a very adpet commander and possibly deserves a rightful position in the top ten.

 

-Gusatvus Adolphus

 

Certainly a phrase rife with personal religious values, which was the spirit of the times. Back to Gustavus Adolphus in Livonia and Polish Prussia, if I may.

 

I have made good use of the Svenska Krig, by one Ulf Sundberg (with the help of a translator, thus I couldn't study the work thoroughly), and the Zaglobasatvern discussions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (thank you ataman). But there is much uncertainty, in terms of detail, about this war. Much national bias exudes from both sides.

Originally posted by Majkes ...We had more serious oponents. In 1621 over 100.000 Ottomans army invaded Poland. I can assure You that Gustav Adolf and Swedish weren't at that time consider as a force which could defeat PolishLithuanian army...

Perhaps, but they must have really underestimated the Swedes by leaving such a scant amount of forces; Gustavus occupied Livonia and Courland by the end of 1622. The Ottomans were checked by Jan Chodkiewicz in 1621, and, unless I'm missing something, no serious threat to the Polish-Lithunian Commonwealth emerged from the south-east again until 1633, and Stanislaw Koniecpolski crushed Tartar threats from 1624-1626, which allowed for his arrival against Gustavus in November, 1626. But Tartar raids would still disrupt life in SE Poland.  

I am guilty of some mistakes earlier, relying too much on my memory from many readings; I was a little a jumbled with some trivia.

Originally posted by ataman 'It was after the Polish campaign in which Gustavus substituted the bayonet for the pike,' If I understand this sentence, you mean that GA introduced bayonets to his army? I've never heard about it. Can you writesomething more about these bayonets?If I understand this sentence, you mean that GA introduced bayonets to his army? I've never heard about it. Can you writesomething more about these bayonets?

I apologize, and good observation on your part. This is a bad mistake on my part. I need to slow down and pay better attention, and stick to one topic at a time. As many of us know, the bayonet wasn't around until the late 1640s, and in another theater in Europe. I misinterpreted something, including the wrong weapon substituted, from J.F.C. Fuller, in his Armament and History, Pg. 99, at the conclusion of his summary of Gustavus' reforms,

 

Many Gustavus detractors, perhaps mostly German and Polish Catholics etc., have the right to view him as a master propogandist, but in his mind he justified himself in terms of contemporary ideals, and plotted each move with the care of a diamond cutter.
 
The campaigns fought by Gustaf II Adolf, more commonly known to us outside of Sweden as Gustavus Adolphus, the king of Sweden, in Livonia and Polish Prussia between 1617 and 1629 recieve comparitively little attention. This disappoints me, as the military reforms of Gustavus, those of utilizing his country's patriotic fervor with a draft of manpower and combining arms of shock power with cavalry charges in conjunction with infantry and lighter and more mobile field artillery, were surely influenced by the fact that the superior Polish-Lithuanian cavalry, most notably the vaunted husaria (plural for hussar), the crack heavy Polish cavalry, and the pancerni, the medium cavalry, could not be beaten at this time in the early 17th century without utilizing combined arms and terrain not conducive to their style, which would diminish their ability to fight to the degree that ensured them victory. As it turned out, it worked.  
 

Gustavus' father, king Karl (Charles) IX of Sweden, repulsed an incursion into Sweden by Sigismund III at Stangebro (near modern Linkoping) in 1598. Sigismund III desired to establish a permanent union between Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but instead created hostilities which led to intermittent war between the 2 nations lasting until 1660. He was, however, unsuccessful when he invaded Livonia in 1600; his army was smashed by Jan Chodkiewicz's husaria at Kircholm in 1605, and another army helping the Muscovites under Jakob De la Gardie was defeated 10 years later at Kluchino. But Sweden's power was rising in the Baltic, as her fleet appeared outside Danzig (modern Gdansk) and Riga, capturing and searching ships trading with these prominent ports. Because of Danzig's neutral status at this time, the Swedes were able to provision their troops in Livonia from there. Aging and overwrought, Karl IX died in October, 1611, while war with Christian IV of Denmark, known as the War of Kalmar, which broke out the previous April, was looking inauspicious for Sweden. As a ruler, Karl IX, basically a practical man, was the link between his great father Gustavus Vasa and his even greater son.
 
At 16 years of age, Gustavus Adolphus inherited the wars his father began, and only by exerting himself to the utmost was he able to achieve peaceful settlements with Denmark (Treaty of Knarod, January, 1613) and Russia (Treaty of Stolbova, February, 1617). He had to restrict himself due to the terms involving indemnity with Denmark, but his treaty with Russia altogether shut out Muscovy from the Baltic, with its trade there being dependent on Sweden. It was clear that Gustavus would resolve to take up the struggle with the Poles in Livonia if necessary. The Sveriges Riksdag (Swedish Diet) consented to this in spite of financial difficulties.
 
Hostilies had already begun in 1617, though a truce had been formally agreed upon in 1613 and prolonged for 2 years the following year. The king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Sigismund III , whose unfortunate and unwavering claims to the throne of Sweden (by birth he was united along the royal lines of the Vasa and Jagiello) would involve Poland in a whole series of unprofitable wars with Sweden spanning 6 decades, instructed his government to not renew the truce. The Swedes captured Pernau (modern Parnu), and by the autumn of 1618 Gustavus was willing to arrange an armistice, but Sigismund III rejected every proposal in that course, keeping unflinchingly to his claim to be acknowledged King of Sweden. Finally a truce was arranged on September 23, 1618, and Jan Chodkiewicz, who had conducted himself with such esteem on the Livonian front, was sent against the Ottoman threat from the south. The great Polish hetman died in September, 1621, amid his successful entrenched defense against the Sultan Osman II's huge invading army at Khotyn (Chocim), in the Ukraine. During this time the rivalry between Gustavus and Sigismund III transposed into a very different and higher plane.

 

Another blow for the Poles was the death of Jan Zamoyski in 1605. It had been the firm conviction of this great szlachcic and magnate that Poland could not achieve any long term success against Sweden without a navy. But his efforts to prevail upon Danzig (modern Gdansk) to produce a fleet were in vain, as the neutral city didn't want to displease the Swedish sovereign at the time (among other reasons).

 

 

A permanent peace could not be reached between Gustavus and Sigismund III to replace the existing truce, so Gustavus again arrived with his army at the mouth of the Dvina in May of 1625 with some 20,000 men aboard 76 ships (?), his army now in a rapidly-advancing phase of a newly forged instrument of war. His forces attacked at 3 points - (1) Courland, taking the ports of Ventspils (Windau) and Liepaja (Libau), (2) Kokenhausen (modern Koknese), and (3) Dorpat (modern Tartu). No major field engagements occured, but Kokenhausen was taken on July 15, 1625, followed by the castle of Birzai a week later. The attempt of a Polish colonel to retake Riga with 2,000 men was repulsed, and a 2nd attempt by the Chancellor of Lithunia, Jan Stanislaw Sapieha, with 3,000 men (these figures are not confirmed) was driven off with a loss of all their guns. Around the same time, Dorpat was taken by Jakob De la Gardie, and in late September Mitawa was taken by Swedish forces. But Polish forces prevented Gusav Horn from capturing Dunaberg (modern Daugavpils).

 

By now, reloading speeds in his army were improved to the point where only 6 ranks of musketeers could maintain a continuous barrage, and firepower was greatly increased by the addition of a copiuos field artillery. Probably in 1626, the 3 lb. leather guns were introduced, which could fire at a rate not much slower than a musketeer. It was named the 'leather gun' because the external casing (frame) of the barrel was made of leather. The bore (tube) of the gun was made of copper. Every effort was made to curtail weight, and without its comparitively light carriage, and the gun weighed 90 lbs (about 400 lbs. including the carriage). The 'leather gun' could easily be manuevered on the battlefield by 2 men and 1 horse. It possessed the asset of mobility to the highest degree, and albeit it was a major technological development, it turned out to have 1 major drawback: the gun sacrificed too much to lightness and mobility, and upon repeated fire it became so hot that a new charge would often ignite spontaneously, which could lead to disaster amongst its crew, who could still be in the recoil path. Once Gustavus entered Germany in 1630, the 'leather gun' had been replaced by the 4lb. piece Suedoise, made of material of slightly more substance, if slightly less mobile (a 3rd man was required with but still 1 horse to handle it). This regimental gun was supreme, and could fire 8 rounds of grapeshot to every 6 shots by an enemy musketeer. This was effected because its design involved a new artillery cartridge, in which the shot and repellant charge were wired together to expedite holding. The science of field artillery may be arguably said to have been invented by Gustavus.

 

In late 1625, Gustavus could be fairly sure of his ground. Sweden was more prepared for war than ever; the unity of king, ministry, noble class, and people was in marked contrast to the condition of any other European state. The ordinary soldiers were given a personal stake in their country, as Gustavus provided land as compensation for service, and for the officers, usually farms on crown lands, form which they collected rent from the tenant-farmer. When not on campaign, the soldier worked on these farms in exchange for board and lodging. I'll spare these details, but basically the soldiers of Sweden under Gustavus' reign became bound to the land and assisited with its maintenance. Thus the civilian population was involved with the army and its support, and Gustavus was supported to utilize Swedish commerce and industry to fully subsidize the wars he would fight. Moreover, a system of regulated conscription and administration was established, in which each province raised regiments which were supported by local taxes. These provincial regiments would remain permanent. Also by 1625, the Sveriges Riksdag (Swedish Parliament) was operating on a regular annual budget with a reformed fiscal system. Drafts to supply men to the regular army were drawn from the militia, which was the home-defence force in which all able-bodied men over the age of 15 were liable to serve. However, the population of Sweden was too small to provide all the soldiers Gustavus needed; after all, he would be fighting countries vastly outnumbering Sweden in population. This void was filled by soldiers of fortune (mercenaries), but not the cut-throat bands which ravaged central Europe; the professioanl mercenaries who fought for Gustavus accepted the stern discipline in return for treatment as good as that recieved by native Swedes. The Green Brigade (brigades in Gustavus' army were named after the color of their flags), composed mostly of Scottish soldiers, was among the finest units of the Thirty Years' War, and led by the likes of Robert Munro, John Hepburn, Alexander Leslie, and Donald Mackay.

Nobody has the right to claim a monopoly on 'the truth'. That in itself is a red flag. These towns didn't have walls with bastions? I doubt that. Sigismund III should have mobilized sooner. Sweden may have had a standing army, but their population was 1/5 of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Gustavus gave war a new look by altering the equipment and tactics of his cavalry. Whether his cuirassiers galloped or sped at a trot, they achieved success when charging home in a very tight formation with cold steel supported by infantry fire. These squadrons functioned as an effective battering ram. The discipline of the Swedes became exemplary, religious duties strictly observed, and crime virtually non-existent. I certainly never have thought of any account I have read of how 'wonderful' Gustavus as being hearsay. I believe them. The Polish army was not overall better, beginning in 1625; the days of Kircholm and Klushino were in the past, and the Swedes learned their lessons. Gustavus would not let that happen again; no Swedish force would ever be fooled by a feint to pull them out of a strong position again; his earthworks were not merely to hide behind, but also to provide security to fall back on if things went awry. This was sound war-making. I am inclined to think the Baltic ports of Pillau (modern Baltiysk) and Konigsberg (modern Kaliningrad) could not have been vulnerable to the degree it was child's play for the Swedes to take them, and there was also diplomacy involved. They probably were defended by the trace italienne system. The town of Zamosc, to cite an example, though further to the south-east, saw the construction of new walls and 7 bastions by 1602. It seems quite accurate the Swedish onslaught in the 1620s initially made good progress because of an overall vulnerable scenario, and I retract my opinion about the implausibility of Gustavus not attacking the Poles, who waited in the open field on one specific situation we discussed; I didn't realize it was Tczew you were talking about. The common numbers there were 9,000 (3,000+ infantry) total for Koniecpolski, and about 14,000 (about 7,000 infantry) for Gustavus. One expert on the 30 Years' War, Dr. Geoffrey Parker, who did research Polish accounts with the help of translators (Robert Frost), wrote in his The Military Revolution, Pg 37,

 

"...Several outraged books and pamphlets were promptly written by Polish propagandists, excoriating the invaders for their 'unchivalrous deceit' in raising ramparts around their camps 'as though they needed a grave-digger's courage to conceal themselves', and deploring their painstaking siege techniques as 'Kreta robota (mole's work)'. But, mole's work or not, Crown Prince Wladislaw was immediately dispatched to the Netherlands to learn about these deceitful tactics at first hand. he was followed by Polish engineers, such as Adam Freitag who, in 1631, published at Leiden an international classic on developments in military fortification..."

 

This is from Richard Brzezinski, an authority on this chapter of history,

 

"...if you take an UNBIASED (as in non-patriotic) view of Polish-Swedish actions from 1622 onwards through to the Great Northern War they are characterised by a consistent reluctance of the Poles to charge when the Swedish cavalry is deployed in formal battle-order backed by their infantry and artillery firepower. Take away the fire support, and the hussars are far less hesistant, and generally victorious..."

 

ataman, I did read the excellent details provided by experts on the Zaglobastavern group (thank you), and I noticed Radislow Sikora, who denounces Brzezinski, seems to be assiduously working to right what he thinks are wrongs. He claims to have figures from the Polish army register, but Daniel Staberg gives figures I agree with, which he claims come from the plan of the battle draw by Gustavus himself.    

 

Now, I made some mistakes regarding the commanders concerning Wallhof(Walmojza, near modern Zeimelis?) - mistakes in interpreting the sources. I read somewhere that one Marshall Leon Sapieha was the son of the famed Chancellor Lew Sapieha. Thus I wrongly assumed that when I read elsewhere 'the son of the Chancellor commanded the Poles/Lithuanians at Wallhof', that the commander was Leon Sapieha. It was, and it does state this in Theodore Dodge's work (I need to slow down when studying), that the son of the Chancellor was Jan Stanislaus Sapieha who commanded the army at Wallhof. Leon (1609-1656) was a younger half-brother who was Marshall later, in the 1630s. According to this, it seems that Lew and Leon are the same man being referred to:

 

http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazimierz_Leon_Sapieha_(syn_Lwa)

 

Now, what does the (syn_Lwa) mean? Lew or Leo, yes? Anyway, before the Battle of Wallhof was fought, Gustavus apparently beat back 2 attempts by small forces to retake Riga.

Originally posted by ataman ...This number 1500 is from the letter of Jan Sapieha.

That figure is more likely the casualties he suffered. Sapieha fled, understandably, from the field and Gustavus took Birzen (modern Birzai). Shame can lead a man to downplay his infamy (I would). According to Radislow Sikora, the army records found stated that it was possibly a higher number than Sapieha claimed - 2,000, but no higher. Well, it could very well have been higher, and Sapieha clearly didn't give an accurate count, a count being smaller than the actual amount. As I stated earlier, the truce agreed in late 1622 was in actuality to gain time to prepare for assured upcoming hostilities; the quote from F. Nowak in his contribution to the Cambridge History of Poland to 1696, Pg. 480,
 

"...summer of 1622, a preliminary agreement was concluded in August. Renewed in November, the truce was prolonged year after year until 1625, though the sole object of each side was to gain time for war preparations."
 
Thus, unless one chooses to disbelieve professor Nowak, Radziwill and Sapieha would surely not have divided their forces after Gustavus' invasion with such miniscule numbers. After all, not more than 20 miles seperated them (one force is claimed to have been 6 miles away from Sapieha), and if we are to believe the scenario that Gustavus destroyed a force of merely 2,000 at most, what became of the other forces in the region? There is no explanation that I can find. Why would Gustavus be compelled to ambush a force, after a forced march of over 30 miles in 36 hours in difficult terrain, if faced with a much smaller army, claimed by Polish sources to be maybe 1/3 of his size? He constantly tried to achieve truces. No, his force seems to have been about 2,000 cavalry, including the Finnish Hakkapelites, and 1,100 musketeers. The Poles under Sapieha apparently had 2,600 cavalry and about 1,300 infantry. I have read some accounts claiming their infantry alone numbered more than 3,400, but this is perhaps an elaboration to sweeten Gustavus' victory. One account states that Jan Sapieha's army was deployed on a ridge with the expectation the Swedes would would emerge in march formation. But Gustavus appeared in battle formation, with the infantry in the center and cavalry on the flanks. The Poles were scattered from Gustavus' amalgam of cavalry charges supported by musket fire. The Poles/Lithuanians were indeed surprised by Gustavus' formation, and he exploited some disorder in their ranks, but I don't believe they were surprised in a non-fortified position, with only 1,500-2,000 men. To believe this would be to believe they were incredibly stupid, knowing an invader had recently come, even though it was the winter. The other commanders in the area were Radziwill and one Aleksander Gosiewski, and I believe the figure of 7,000 attributed to Jan Sapieha's force by Swedish accounts was very likely the number for all 3 combined, and it was Sapieha's defeated army at Wallhof which numbered around 4,000. Gustavus was the one outnumbered. The Ottoman threat was now subordinate to [b Gustavus' presence, and to leave such a scant amount of troops in the wake of Gustavus' invasion was manifestly inviting disaster. The fact Gustavus was better equipped to conduct a winter campaign than his enemy, in their own territory no less, illustrates his sagacity amid war. Moreover, they knew Gustavus had just taken the towns of Mitawa (Mitau, modern Jelgava)) and Bauska (Bauske). They must have been in a 'time of war' frame of mind, regardless of the winter conditions. But it is certainly fair to keep an open mind. The great 20th century military theorist (among other things), B.H. Liddell Hart says the Battle of Wallhof was perhaps the earliest example in modern military history of the principles of concentration, both strategical and tactical, and of the combination of fire and movement, which forms the burden of every military manual nowadays (Hart wrote this in 1927). Gustavus, now with complete control of Livonia, wanted to make peace (albeit favorable to his position), and sent an embassy to Warsaw. But part of it was seized, and due to the difficulty to procure their release, peace was not in the cards. Jakob De la Gardie, who would later advocate peace with Poland, was left in Livonia to secure the Swedish position, and Gustavus returned to Stockholm.  

 

The way was now clear for a new theater of operations for Gustavus in Polish Prussia. Here he resolved to secure control of the Vistula, as he had already secured the Dvina. The mouth of the Vistula poured into the Baltic at Danzig (modern Gdansk), and was the vital artery of Poland's economy. With the Vistual blocked, and Danzig captured or neutralized, the Polish magnates would certainly compel Sigismund III to make peace. This campaign would also relieve much stress, hopefully, on the Prtotestants in Germany, as Imperialists would come to the aid of Sigismund III. Gustavus landed near Pillau (modern Baltiysk) on the Vistula Lagoon (the Zalew Wislany) on June 25, 1626 with about 14,000 men, aboard about 150 ships. He took Pillau after negotiations failed with his brother-in-law, Georg Wilheml, the Elector of Brandenburg. This action threatening Poland's access to the Baltic. He discerned that he needed to occupy as much of the Baltic coast as he could before joining the struggle in Germany, and do it quickly; the Poles had been lax in concentrating forces to deal with him, and this he would take full advantage of. After the fall or surrender of  Braniewo (Braunsberg), Elblag (Elbing), Frombork (Frauenburg), Tolkmicko (Tolkemit), and Malbork (Marienburg) by early July, 1626, he was in possession of the fertile and defensible delta of the Vistula in Prussia, which he viewed as a permanent conquest, and he commissioned Axel Oxenstierna as the region's first Governor-General. Communications between Danzig (modern Gdansk), which was his hope for a valuable base and depot, and the Polish interior were cut off by the erection of the first of Gustavus' famous entrenched camps around Tczew (Dirschau). By also storming Gniew (Mewe) on July 12, 1626, the Poles were further threatened with losing access to Danzig from the interior.

Originally posted by ataman ...The Swedes didn't try to siege or capture Gdansk. They only tried to destroy Polish fleet (after the battle of Oliwa 1627, the Swedes realized that they have to take into consideration Polish fleet, which could be dangerous for them) and capture Wisloujscie, which blocked a way to Gdansk for Swedish ships.

Yes, it seems he tried to blockade Danzig, which clearly was viable, being he cut its communications from both sides. But he could never completely prevent it being provisioned by the sea, and the city's ability to hold out practically neutralized Gustavus' successes throughout the 4 year campaign. Due to the impracticability that the city could be reduced to straits, he sought to secure its neutrality. This is where he might have been a little rash and lost patience; he was already eyeing the situation in Germany nad might have been hoping to bring the Polish war to a speedy end, which depended on the submission or neutrality of Danzig. A less hectoring style of diplomacy might have procured Danzig's neutrality. It is indeed mentioned in one of my sources that he reconnoitred the fortress of Weichselmunde (Wisloujscie), and he began recruiting from his newly acquired territories, including the procurement of valuable, indigenous horses.

 

It was in late September, 1626 when Sigismund III arrived upon the theater of operations with a field army in the vicinity of Grudziadz (Graudenz), and after conscriptions from here and Torun (Thorn), his force totalled some 15,400+, of which about 9,000 were cavalry (about 4,000 husaria). Torun lies on the Vistula about 30+ miles south of Grudziadz. Sigismund III resolved to blockade Gniew, with the intention of drawing Gustavus further south, away from his base at Tczew and the vicinity around the Danzig perimeter. The Poles had recently retaken the fortress of Orneta (Wormditt), perhaps proving other fortresses Gustavus had easily taken earlier could not serve as a permanent defenses. Thus he had to march out against Sigismund III. Led by Sigismund III and his son Wladyslaw, the Poles advanced towards Malbork; on meeting the Swedes, whom they outnumbered, some skirmishes broke out, and the Poles withdrew south, crossed the Vistula at Nowe (Neuenburg), and began to siege Gniew from the town's south side. Clearly, the terrain did not lend itself well to the Poles against Gustavus' deployments. Gustavus had an assembled force around Tczew of about 7,600, including nearly 1,300 cavalry. He headed for threatened Gniew (Mewe) with about 3,500 men (3,000 foot and 500 horse). The relief of Gniew was a necessity for carrying out the campaign he intended, so he devised a tactic to effect it. With some light horse and artillery, the Poles had occupied a position athwart his path. Gustavus resorted to a ruse, making his movements appear as a reconnaisance, and proceeded to withdraw. After this clever disposition apparently deceiving the Poles, he then ordered Heinrich Matthias von Thurn and John Hepburn to create another diversion and cut a passage over a strongly fortified hill defended by the Poles, who vastly outnumbered them. Thurn and his cavalry diverted the Poles' attention by demonstrative actions, and held up in some serious skirmishing with their lighter cavalry (probably the Cossack Cavalry, though not necessarily ethnic Cossacks); the Poles were given the impression the Swedish garrison was going to be drawn from within Gniew, and that the place would fall to them in any event, so they made no immediate advance. Perhaps they should have attacked sharply in significant numbers and closely observe the region to ascertain Gustavus' real intentions. If they had, the campaign for Gustavus might have ended here for good. But that's 20/20 hindsight. 

 

Simultaneous with Thurn's diversionary activity, the column commanded by Hepburn, which had started at dusk and unseen by Sigismund III's men, approached the enemy position by working around it and ascending the hill by a narrow and winding path, which was encumbered by difficult terrain. Weighed with heavy muskets, cartridges, breastplates, helmets, and defense obstacles (I'll explain in a bit), they made their way up through the enemy's outposts unobserved, and reached the summit, where the ground was smooth and level. By tactical surprise, here they fell at once upon the Poles, who were busy arranging their trenches. For a time, Hepburn and his men gained a footing here; but a deadly fire, mostly musketry, opened upon them from all points, compelling them the to fall back from the trenches. But now they were charged upon by armored husaria. Hepburn drew off his men till they reached a rock on the plateau, and here they made their stand, the musketeers occupying the rock, the pikemen forming in a wall around it.

 

Gustavus had provided them with a valuable defense items, which was utilized effectively here at the battle of Gniew - a portable Cheval de frise (Fr. = Frisian horses') and the Scweinfedder ('Swedish', or 'Swine', feather'). The bayonet was not yet in use, and musketeers often adopted defensive weapons to protect themselves from cavalry. This small version of the Cheval de frise consisted of a portable frame, probably a simple log, with many long iron spikes protruding from it. It was erected more in camp and principally intended to stop cavalry dead in its tracks, but was not a serious obstacle to the passage of mobile infantry. But here Hepburn was using smaller versions. The Scweinfedder was a pointed stake (a half-pike about 6ft. long) and musket-rest combination, which had replaced the more cumbersome fork-firing rest. The stake was planted pointing toward the enemy cavalry (the musket rested upon a loop) to act as a defensive obstacle, particularly against shock cavalry. Gustavus' Swedish army used the Scweinfedder against in the Polish campaign more so than against their enemies in Germany later probably because the terrain offered better cover against cavalry, and there was less cavalry in Germany than Poland. They quickly fixed these obstacles along their front (remember, they were portable), and it aided the pikemen greatly in resisting the desperate charges of the Polish horsemen. Their German allies, armed with muskets (or arquebusiers?), aided immeasurably in the effectuated defensive. Hepburn and his force withstood the Polish army for 2 days. Soon, however, they would certainly be overcome by an amalgam of fire and shock from a preponderance of forces, so they withdrew, both sides being proportionately scathed very little.

 

While this desperate action was taking place, and the attention of the Poles entirely occupied on Hepburn, Gustavus himself managed to pass a strong force of men and a store of ammunition into the town from the north side, and then turned to protect Thurn's withdrawal, at which point the husaria could make no headway before Gustavus' infantry firepower. Sigismund III, seeing that  Gustavus had achieved his purpose of relieving Gniew, retired with the loss of some 500 men. It is quite possible that Sigismund could very well have thought Gustavus was in force the entire time, and with his artillery, thus they may have thought he was  trying to draw them from their good position. The Swedes did not outright beat the Poles and compel them to flee, but Gniew was re-victualed and the garrison substantially strengthened by Gustavus. Moreover, the terrain around Gniew would surely be utilized by Gustavus to neutralize any devastating effect the Polish cavalry could usually rely upon. Nevertheless, it was a superbly handled operation on the part of Gustavus. The Polish historian Jerzy Teodorczyk calls this battle the 1st defeat of the husaria, but I think it should more appropriately called the 1st 'prevention' of a defeat from the husaria.

 

Though Gustavus would begin to endure some severe harassing from better-led enemy forces, with the terrific Stanislaw Koniecpolski coming onto the scene in late 1626, the object of his campaign so far was a success - to secure a base of operations encircling Danzig; the Swedes held Putzig (modern Puck), Tczew (Dirschau), Gniew (Mewe), Elbing (modern Elblag), Brunsberga (Braunsberg, modern Braniewo), and Pillau (modern Baltiysk). Oxenstierna was placed in overall command in October, as Gustavus returned to Sweden to organize reinforcements. It seems Sigismund overtured peace, but the ministry and people of Sweden supported Gustavus' refusal to what he deemed were unacceptable conditions, which included the kingship be returned to Sigismund. Towards the end of 1626, probably November, Koniecpolski, who had arrived with great celerity from the east with a little over 6,000 men, began a counter-offensive to reopen the Vistula and relieve the blockade of Danzig.

 

Koniecpolski had retaken Putzig and captured Gniew by diversionary measures, and entrenched his forces. He had quickly captured Putzig in early April, 1627, which reopened Danzig's communications with Germany. But the Swedes' lines to Pillau remained intact. Moreover, the Swedes defeated a Lithuanian force near Koknese (in modern Latvia in December, 1626), detracting a threat to their position there. On April 13, 1627, Koniecpolski decisively intercepted a force of about 4,000 recruited from Germany, marching east from Hammerstein (modern Czarne) through Pomerania for Gustavus, and drove them back to Hammerstein, which he forced 2 days later into capitulation. Earlier I presented a source as stating this force numbered 8,000; ataman told me it was in actuality just 2,500 men. I have recently read it was 4,000. Radoslaw Sikora says Koniecpolski's force outnumbered the force coming from Germany by very little. Whatever the actual number, few Swedes, if any, took place in the battle, and the captured infantry were incorporated into the Polish army, and the surviving cavalry rode back to Germany  The Swedes' plans to strike at Koniecpolski from the other direction were foiled by the flooding of the Vistula. 

 

Gustavus landed at Pillau on May 8, 1627 with about 7,000 recruits. When he reached the army entrenched around Tczew (Dirschau), he found his total troops strength in Poland had been increased to over 20,000 by heavy recruitment. Georg Wilhelm, the Elector of Brandenburg, took up arms against him, but Gustavus made short diplomatic work of the small force of 1,800 entrenched near Pillau, enlisting them under his own standard. Wilhelm would thereafter remain neutral. After some cavalry skirmishing in early May, 1627, in which Gustavus was nearly cut down, he began to reconnoitre the redoubts around the western mouth of the Vistula, a strip of land held by the citizens of Danzig. Viewing the works from a boat, he was shot in the hip on the 25 of May, 1627. This laid him up, delaying operatons, and the Poles began to concentrate their forces. Sigismund III threatened Jakob De la Gardie's position in Livonia, and Gustaf Horn was sent with men to ready themselves for any contingencies. The Swedish operational goal now was seemingly to buttress the region of the eastern side of the Vistula they held, and to defend their hold on Tczew. Danzig now could only be threatened from the east, as Putzig was in Polish hands. Koniecpolski didn't possess enough infantry and artillery to threaten Tczew (Dirschau) itself, so his operational aim was to deny the Swedes access to the eastern routes to Danzig, and lure Gustavus into the open field quick enough to do battle before Swedish artillery could be effected, a situation which would certainly favor his husaria. Koniecpolski began to reconnoitre the Swedish works around Tczew in early August, 1627 with about 9,000 men, of which nearly 6,000 were cavalry. The Swedish garrison numbered over 1,600 men, and Gusatvus' army was slightly over 10,000, of which over 4,000 were cavalry (many accounts say his army was 14,000 total). He possessed maybe 20 guns at most. The Battle of Tczew was set to be fought, beginning on August 7, 1627.

Originally posted by ataman Spartan, sometimes I have a strong feeling that these 'great' historians should learn from us - little people. If Bennett thinks that Wallhof was in Prussia, he should change his map (or check the map). The battle of Wallhof was in Livonia, before Swedish army invaded Prussia. I won't write about the battle of Dirschau any more. You can see that a 'Senior Lecturer at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst' has no idea what happend there...

 

He certainly has a good idea what happened there, and, forgive me, you may very well be an exponent of what Richard Brzezinski tells us about many of the Polish accounts,

 

"...You cannot deal with a subject without quoting both sides of the argument, and until now, all I've ever seen in Polish works is that the hussars were invincible, unstoppable, superior to everything they ever met... If you take the time to read Swedish, German, Austrian contemporary sources another very different voice comes through, which most patriotic Poles will not trouble to listen to, because they know better...I could have written a lot more opinions in praise of the hussar, certainly there's plenty of them... But the point is that this side of the argument is already well known, I just wanted to restore a little balance to a subject which is made so woolly by the requisites of national pride...(As an aside: There is a good reason why Norman Davies' works on Poland are so good. Being Welsh rather than Polish he was a neutral bystander, and didn't come with all that mental baggage which is instilled (sometimes beaten in) from birth in Poland and in Polish families...I went to a Polish school in England for 7 years, and found that the bullsh*t detector in my head was screaming full blast during all Polish history classes, they were just dreadful...)..."

 

This is a heavy remark against Polish students etc., and probably overstated and oversimplified, but Radoslaw Sikora's attempt to falsify Brzezinski's work didn't necessarily confute anything, judging by other contributors on the Zaglobastavern. As for Bennett's brief assessment, I perhaps failed with one word. It almost certainly should read,

 

"...From 1626-1629 he launched annaul attacks on Polish Prussia, after winning his first victory in open field at Wallhof (1626)..."

 

If the wording does stand (I'll check when I look at the book again), Matthew Bennett was simply stating the issue anachronistically (yes, it could have been worded better). He is a professional, and was consulted by 2 authorities on this subject. It is impossible he thought Wallhof was in Prussia, and impossible that he thought the battle was fought after his landing in June, 1626. Hypothetically, if Bennett did commit an egregious geographical mistake, it doesn't belie his statement that Tczew (Dirschau) was a Swedish tactical victory.

 

A brief summary of part of the Battle of Tczew I came across has Gustavus driving away units of Polish horse, who retired through the village of Rokitki (Rokittken), which is located a little west of Tczew. The terrain here is described as much cut up by hills and ravines, and Rokitki was held by Polish infantry and artillery. Gustavus had placed batteries atop a convenient hill, ready to attack the village, but sustained his injury while reconnoittering an adjoining height.   

 

This issue with Brent Hull, whom was neutral, just added to the confusion, with your more comprehensive presentation of his description of the battle. He writes 2 versions, each version slightly favoring each side.

Originally posted by ataman Note - GA had to be cautios.

You seem to constantly allude that Gustavus' caution was some sort of stigma to his generalship. In this case, caution was the sound action. Part of his entire new methods were based from what the Poles and Lithuanians had done to the Swedes before, and to the Muscovites at Klushino in 1610.

Dutch negotiators were in the Polish camp and, assuming the Swedes would not attack during negotiations, Koniecpolski had dispersed much of his cavalry to graze, some as far as 15 km away. The King ordered his cavalry out of their fortifications and drove in the Polish pickets. Note � GA suprised the Poles during negotiations. This is a typical GA's tactic � to attack when the Poles didn't expect it.

The Poles would not have deployed pickets if they assumed Gustavus would not attack, and why would Dutch negotiators be only with the Poles if they were true intermediaries, if they were there for such a purpose? These negotiations were not bilateral, as the Dutch were mostly in disfavor of Gustavus' campaigning in Poland because it disturbed their trade with Danzig, and Albrecht von Wallenstein's, successfull in Germany at this time, promised Sigismund III assistance. The Poles left themselved vulnerable, a situation any good commander will exploit - to strike at one's achilles heel, particularly when the enemy will destroy you with their vaunted weapon if fought under conditions viable for the utilization of that weapon. In this case with the husaria, an open field. Gustavus' concern of the hussars was genuine, and that fear fear of them understandably influenced his operational strategy. As devastating and impressive the Battle of Kircholm in 1605 was a display of the Hussars' formidability and prowess in the open field when drawing an impetuous opponent (Karl IX) into their favorable conditions and off their high ground (Karl thought they were retreating), it induced a false sense of security. When Gustavus invaded in 1621, many fortresses throughout Livonia and Poland on the Baltic were not defended adequately. Gustavus took advantage of this situation very smartly, and coupled with his army revisions, never again would a defeat like Kircholm afflict the Swedish army. Let's go over the Battle of Tczew.

Note � the Poles (about 3000 cavalry) waited for two hours for the Swedes (10 800 soldiers) who didn't want to leave their fortified camp. When they did not they began to return to their camp. With four banners of hussars and two of cossacks left on the eastern side, Note � these 6 units had about 600 cavalrymen.

Gustavus was merely exercising more patience then they were. Sure he wanted to leave his camp, but not under their expectations or terms. For all he knew, they were trying to draw him out, feign a calculated retreat, and attack him in the manner that befell his father 22 years earlier. From what I have read, a banner, or Choragiew, contains around 200 horsemen (sometimes 240). This is from Radoslaw Sikora, amid his article on the Hussars' tactics,

 

"...A banner with 200 Hussars attacks a regiment of infantry with 600 men (400 musket and 200 pike)...",

 

This is comes from one Marciej Rymarz's description of the Polish/Lithuanian attack on Swedish-held Warsaw in 1656,

 

"...The Hussars totaled approximately 1,000-1,100 men, in 8 banners (6 Crown and 2 Lithuanian), so were quite few in number especially compared to the force that might have been raised in earlier years..."

 

We are indeed talking about the earlier years, specifically here at Tczew, thus it is more likely the 1,800 horsemen under Thurn and Erik Soop faced 1,200 husaria (maybe more), who were left behind after Koniecpolski thought they weren't coming out of their camp. Maybe some Choragiews numbered 100 or less at other times, but in this case, 600 husaria against 3 times their number of Swedish cavalry, now only slightly less formidable per se, would have been crushed at a much quicker level than what happened. Koniecpolski's quickly administered counter-attack indeed would have seemingly overwhelmed Thurn, but Soop was placed to stabilize such a contingency, which he did. This 1.5:1 (or a little less) ratio was enough for Gustavus' reformed cavalry to repulse them. They pursued them until the Irishman Jakob Butler's (or Walter Butler?) musketeers, well placed, prevented any overwhelming rout of the withdrawing hussars. What a novelty: the husaria withdrawing after a fight with enemy horsemen, even if not a scattered and wildly broken retreat. I have read that the The Poles lost all their lances amid combat, which is why they really withdrew? This is very doubtful. Why had this not happened before? They couldn't still fight with their sabers? Though attacked in flank by the enemy, Herman Wrangel, positioned in conducive terrain for what he was up against, held up against Marcin Kazanowski. If not thoroughly beaten back, the fact Kazanowski withdrew and Wrangel did not clealry indicates the Poles conceded. Both sides may have been in the same position when they started, but the 1st day was a tactical success for the Swedes, not a draw; it was the Poles who withdrew and returned to their camp, not a mutual scenario. Radoslaw Sikora's implication that because

Seriously - I'd like to comment your post, but I can't do it at once.

 

I have also one question/proposal - maybe it will be better to create separate thread to discuss this topic? What do you think? If not, I will write my replies here, but I'm affraid that our discussion will bore most of readers.

Sparten

 

This is from Franklin D. Scott's Sweden: the Nation's History, Pg. 172,

 

"...Gustav Adolf's leather-wrapped guns worked effectively, and the Battle of Dirschau (Tczew) showed the Swedes had finally learned the lesson of their humiliating defeat at Kircholm in 1605; now their cavalry bested the Polish - reputedly the best in Europe. However, the outcome of the 1627 season still failed to convince the Poles they were beaten; and they took heart from the prospect of imperial support..."

 

If this is true that only means that GA having better infantry, better artillery and better cavalry wasn't able to decisevely defeat Koniecpolski which clears that Koniecpolski was better than GA.