...can i just mention that i am personally familiar with Andrew Roberts from a recent employment situation and the man has a weak grip of reality from what i experienced and i know from some intimate conversations i was involved in, that Roberts prduces 'revisionist' history, sometimes for the sake of it, and to deliberately raise his own profile....that is the man's motivation, self-interest.... (sound familiar?)

Certainly you are not suggesting the same reference, any author of such a thread as this might be, hypotheticaly?  

And while I am all for freedom of expression and opinion....this imo, is simply a move to get air time elsewhere for a discredited premis, based on revisionist history, by less then reputable sources, starting with Engdahl first, although your right Robert's is running a firm second. The jig is up Bankotsu.

�..while Bankotsu continues to revise all commonly accepted, credible, and resourced reasons regarding Nazi foreign policy motivation, and somehow seems convinced that Mr Hitler was �guided� and encouraged by Britain, it might be prudent to take a look at Hitler�s foreign policy ideas before any meaningful political contact between the Nazi�s and British government�.�I have deliberately focussed on the book by �Noakes and Pridham� as it is a comprehensive collection of primary source documents and free from bias and �revisionist� thinking..

�as most people know, Hitler�s first attempt to put forward a reasoned foreign policy was found in his book Mein Kampf written in 1924-25, even then, Hitler�s ideas were designed to enforce German dominion over Europe and provide the basis for world supremacy�(Britain of course, kindly helped out by providing a ghost-writer and guidance as to what he should do eh?!!!)�in 1919, he expressed some rather conventional ideas about Germans goals�for example, he focused on the revision of the Versailles Treaty and the acquisition of former lost German colonies and the unification of a Greater Germany...that�s 1919 Bankotsu�not 1936 or 37�it must also be noted that during this time, Hitler regarded Britain and France as the main �enemies��. Not Russia�(plenty of Anglo-Adolf collusion going on there then?)�.

�Let us look at our enemies! We can divide them into two groups: one group includes the absolute opponents: England and America, the second group: nations which become our opponents as a result of their unfortunate situation or as a result of their circumstances�we have been pursuing a Polish policy since Bismarck�s time�

Speech made in the 10^th December 1919 taken from police reports of the episode (real documents Bankotsu, not opinion or revisionist theory) Nazism 1919-1945 Book 3: Foreign Policy and Racial Extermination eds J. Noakes and G.Pridham 1988.

Hitler believed Germany was a �nation without space� when compared to Russia, US, Britain and France and believed that the �big cities� and �rootless masses� were easy prey to Marxism (fear of the Soviet Union yes?). Hitler�s solution to this was the acquisition of more territory, as we all know, the idea of Lebensraum. To do this however, Hitler realised that he would have to free Germany from the constraints imposed by the Versailles Treaty (of course Bankotsu, with a firm British hand pushing him from behind yes? Even though this was the early 1920�s)�Hitler knew he would need allies to take on the might of Britain and France, and initially, he looked towards the possibility of an alliance with Russia. However, in 1919 (that�s 1919 again Bankotsu), Hitler became influenced by a group of Baltic Germans who were refugees from the Russian Revolution, and they convinced Hitler (Baltic Germans, not the British) that the Revolution was the work of the Jews. By 1922 (are you keeping track Bankotsu, that�s 1922), Hitler was adopting a firm and aggressive anti-Russian position.

In addition, the occupation of the Ruhr region by France in 1923 led Hitler to believe that the French were adopting a policy of dismemberment of Germany. Moreover, he was aware of British opposition to the occupation, and judged this to be a British fear of French hegemony in Europe. Hitler actually felt that an Anglo-German alliance against France was a possibility but such an alliance would also prove to be a barrier to the acquisition of German colonies. Hitler�s problem was how to balance all these shifts of power into a favourable position for Germany. At each and every stage, it was Hitler�s wishes and planning that led to the move eastward. Hitler deduced from all this power-play that the only way Germany could get �living-space� was to take it from Russia. Hitler believed this was the only way to avoid a WWI situation where Germany had to face both Britain and Russia. Hitler had made the decision to move eastwards, it was only a matter of time. (This was 1923 Bankotsu). Hitler made clear this option in Mein Kampf.

��we National Socialists have intentionally drawn a  line under the foreign policy of pre-war Germany�.We are putting an end to the perpetual German march towards the south and West of Europe and turning our eyes towards the land in the East�.we must principally bear in mind Russia�..destiny itself seems to wish to point the way for us there��

Mein Kampf cited in Nazism 1919-1945 Book 3: Foreign Policy and Racial Extermination eds J. Noakes and G.Pridham 1988.

While laying down these plans, Hitler had no contact with Britain but assumed that he knew Britain�s intentions�

�England�whose natural selfish interests (see my other post) are not, at any rate essentially, opposed to the German peoples requirements for existence�

Mein Kampf cited in Nazism 1919-1945 Book 3: Foreign Policy and Racial Extermination eds J. Noakes and G.Pridham 1988.

But as I noted earlier, by 1939, Britain�s self interests did oppose Hitler�s intentions.

Hitler s construction of German foreign policy can be seen as a process of five stages and can be viewed in his book Mein Kampf.

1-The removal of restrictions on the German rearmament programme (imposed by the Versailles Treaty).

2-The destruction of France�s arrangement of alliances.

3-A conflict with France to secure Germany�s western boundaries in order for Germany to concentrate on the move eastward and put into effect the policy of Lebensraum.

4-the conquest of Russia to win �living-space�.

5-The notion of racial dominance over the world, possibly by confronting Britain.

After he had written Mein Kampf, � Hitler�s basic foreign policy objectives did not change�. Noakes and G.Pridham 1988.

Right Bankotsu, at what stage did Britain help Hitler in coming up with this plan and where did Britain encourage him to follow it through almost perfectly apart from stage 5????? It was Hitler�s policy almost from the very first day he could put it into print, and his intention was to follow it through regardless of any interference from other European powers. However, on coming to power in 1933, Hitler had no clear idea how to implement his foreign policy programme and was subject to the realities of power of the time, which led to the diplomatic confrontation with Britain and a change in plans. Afterall, Hitler was planning for war at a much later date.

Another insight into British foreign policy at the time can be seen by the negotiations held during the mid-30�s. In 1935, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, and the Under-Secretary, Anthony Eden met with Hitler and Ribbentrop. One aim of this meeting was an attempt to bring back Germany into the League of Nations. John Simon explained �it was the object of British policy to serve peace by securing cooperation amongst all European countries. They hoped Germany would cooperate with all the others.�

Cited in Nazism 1919-1945 Book 3: Foreign Policy and Racial Extermination eds J. Noakes and G.Pridham 1988

In addition, by the mid 1930�s, Hitler and Robbentrop became disillusioned with Britain�s refusal to sign a bilateral agreement. �Hitler became aware that the British government was not prepared to do a deal on the basis of a free-hand for Germany in Eastern Europe in return for German support for the British Empire�

Noakes and G.Pridham 1988.

If it was indeed Britain�s intention to push Hitler Eastward Bankotsu, don�t you think Britain would have allowed a Nazi �freehand� in Eastern Europe, as this would be the logical first step to take in an invasion of Russia? And Hitler was offering German support for British Imperial interests in exchange!!!! Well, deary me, that was a bad move by the anti-Russian British government�

On a final trip to London, Hitler advised Ribbentrop to  �get Britain to join the Anti-Comintern pact�but if in future all our efforts are still in vain, fair enough, then I am ready for war�.

Cited in Nazism 1919-1945 Book 3: Foreign Policy and Racial Extermination eds J. Noakes and G.Pridham 1988

Ribbentrop did try to stoke up anti-Russian sentiment and he did find some favour from some minor back-benchers and fringe figures in the conservative party. However, to those that matter, Ribbentrop�s threats, and scare tactics did not work. The British government remained unwilling to commit to an anti-Bolshivik �crusade� and Hitler looked to Italy as a formative ally (Another bad mistake from the British if we are to believe Bankotsu�s proposition.) From Ribbentrop�s conclusions, Hitler released his views to the Propaganda Ministry�.

��the Fuhrer concludes that Germany must stay unaltered at Italy�s side and has no interest in coming to an understanding with England�..

By the time it came for Lord Halifax to visit Hitler, Adolf was unwilling to deal with any British diplomats in the belief that an alliance with Britain could not be achieved which would allow Germany to fulfil its desire for living-space. Hitler now views Britain as obstruction to his eastern bound foreign policy!!!!!!!!!!!!! (that�s obstruction Bankotsu not encouragement).

In paper addressed to Adolf Hitler, Ribbentrop neatly and accurately summed up Britian�s position (no need to defend the British view and motivations then, the Nazi�s were doing it as well!!). Ribbentrop wrote�

�the English ruling class will today just as in the past fight to the limit i.e to the point of war, to defend both its important material interests and its position of power in the world so long as there is a chance of winning. England will never risk such a commitment lightly. It will always carefully weigh up the situation and if necessary postpone decisions. If at some point, it has the advantage it will fight. The non-intervention by England in the Abyssinian War is in my view not the result of a lack of heroism but a result of the fact that England had criminally neglected its armaments and of the false assessment of the situation by the English government�

�which just so happens to be the reason why Britain did not contemplate an early war with Germany, and Hitler knew this and was confident that Britain would not intervene when it came to his planned invasion of Poland and the �gateway� to the east. Not because Britain had given the �go-ahead� for Hitler to move eastwards. It was Hitler�s belief in the weakness of Britain that installed self-assurance in his plans to grab lebensraum. Ribbentrop also recognised those politicians in Britain, who still appeared friendly to Germany, would see �an understanding�gradually disappear with the recognition that Germany does not want to bind herself to the status quo in Central Europe�

Quite crucially in this debate Ribbentrop also observed that �No matter what temporary and tactically motivated attempts are made to reach an understanding with us, in future, every day on which our political considerations are not based on the view of England as our most dangerous opponents will be a gain for our enemies.� In other words, diplomatic manoeuvring with the British was seen as yet another obstruction to the conquest of Nazi Germany�s enemies. All this was feverishly digested by Adolf Hitler.

Poland was always going to be a sticking point for Hitler�s plans to move eastwards. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was in part, prompted in order to put pressure on Poland. Hitler could not attack either Russia or France without securing Poland first. During 1938/39, Hitler appears to have moved closer to his plan to attack Russia. Hitler enjoyed reasonable relations with France; even relations with Poland had been relatively good. Once Poland had �accepted� Hitler�s proposal to become a German �satellite state�, then the attack on Russia could begin. Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia, and France all mentioned in this planning, but, curiously, no �Britain�. Why not, because Britain was in fact proving to be an obstacle in Hitler�s desire to move eastwards. (yet again) When it became clear to Britain that Hitler was about to annex a non-German speaking territory, the government tried to salvage the situation by issuing a warning that took the form of a British guarantee to Poland, Romania and Greece (remember Romania Bankotsu?). This made the Poles even less willing to concede to Hitler�s demand to be a German satellite and dug in. Hitler by the way, was fuming at the British guarantee and now seeing that the Poles were not likely to give in, ordered all necessary military preparations. Why did Britain declare war then if Hitler was initially prepared to march on Poland with much less aggression that full-scale war? (remember both Germany and Britain were under-prepared for war at this stage)Britain knew he was going in that direction anyway? Why risk armed conflict with Germany, why not allow Hitler to move on Poland and then of course Russia? (Which your theory suggests Eh Bankotsu?) Lets hear your thoughts, not some discredited revisionist garbage.

To quote Noakes and Pridham once again, �The threat of a German attack on Poland, to which the Western powers had given a guarantee, enhanced the importance of the Soviet Union to both sides. As far as Britain and France were concerned, without Russian cooperation they would find it difficult to come to Poland�s assistance. Britain and Russia were already engaged in negotiations�.

J. Noakes and G.Pridham 1988

On the 22nd August, at a meeting at the Berchtesgaden, Hitler noted�